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A few mothers killed their sons in the hope of protecting
themselves. But the majority, including myself, refused....
Somehow, I managed to flee with the children. We headed
in the direction of our home. But before we got there, my
labour [sic] pains started.... We went into the bush and I
delivered a baby boy. I could only regard this as unfortunate
under the circumstances. [Tutsi men and boys, including ba-
bies, were the killers' main target.] ...
In the evening, an old woman, a neighbour [sic], passed
by on her way to fetch water.... She asked me about the
delivery... She requested that I let her see the baby...
When she saw it was a boy, she commented "Aha, so you
have given birth to another Inyenzi [cockroach]? You are
not going to live yourself." She picked up a stick and hit the
child. He groaned once and then he was dead. He was ten
hours old by then....
She then told me to bury the child. But I refused. I told
her "The blood of my child is on your hands. You bury him
yourself."
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She went back to her house and unleashed her sons on us.
When her sons arrived, they set upon my seven-year-old
boy, Emmanuel Mugiraneza. One of them commented,
"This future Inyenzi, he has to go, otherwise he will be rul-
ing over us when he is older." They dug a small hole first.
Then they pierced him with a sword and while he was still
groaning, they threw him into the hole.
[Then] they started macheting Theogene [my four year
old son] on the head. I literally saw his brains spill out of his
head.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Although nearly eight years have passed since the 1994 genocide
within Rwanda, both the country and people of Rwanda remain broken.
First, Rwanda is broken in a literal sense: the political and governmental
structures simply do not work in achieving equality, peace and protection
for its citizens.
Perhaps more importantly, the collective spirit of Rwanda and the
individual spirits of Rwandans have been subjected to near irreparable
"spirit injury."'2 Sadly, this was a wounding perpetrated by both insiders
and outsiders for the past century, the 100 days of genocide merely the
culmination of 100 years of inflicting spirit injuries upon Rwandans.
To understand the Rwandan genocide, this article relies on two con-
cepts of Critical Race Theory (CRT): the social construction of race
theory3 and the notion of spirit injury. First, to understand the evolution
of ethnic hatred in Rwanda, we must unearth how race was socially con-
structed within Rwanda by colonialists. A central theme of CRT is the
social construction thesis: "[R]ace and races are products of social thought
and relations. Not objective, inherent, or fixed, they correspond to no
biological or genetic reality; rather, races are categories that society in-
vents, manipulates, or retires when convenient."'
Ian E Haney Lopez has defined race in the following way: "Race is
neither an essence nor an illusion, but rather an ongoing, contradictory,
1. AFRICAN RIGHTS, RWANDA NOT So INNOCENT: WHEN WOMEN BECOME KILLERS
58-60 (1995) (testimonial ofTutsi mother Liberata Mukasakindi).
2. See generally Adrien K. Wing, Brief Reflections Toward a Multiplicative Theory and
Praxis of Being, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN's L.J. 181 (1990-91) (discussing the concept of spirit
injuries).
3. Ian E Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE 191 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
4. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL R-ACE THEORY 7 (2001).
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self-reinforcing, plastic process subject to the macro forces of social and
political struggle and the micro effects of daily decisions."' Lopez uses the
term "racial fabrication" to describe how a race is socially constructed.'
This process has four distinct features:
First, humans rather than abstract social forces produce
races. Second, as human constructs, races constitute an inte-
gral part of a whole social fabric that includes gender and
class relations. Third, the meaning-systems surrounding race
change quickly rather than slowly. Finally, races are con-
structed relationally, against one another, rather than in
isolation.
7
The term "fabrication" is preferable to "formation," the former
connoting human involvement with the possibility to deceive as opposed
to the latter's neutrality.
This Article hopes to extend CRT's social construction of race the-
ory by emphasizing ethnicity as well as race. The Rwandans are
undoubtedly within the so-called "Black race." Historically, they have also
been socially constructed as consisting of different races and ethnicities,
even though many scholars and Rwandans do not see ethnic, much less
racial, distinctions.9 Some of these Rwandans who did see such differences
participated in the genocide.
The other concept central to understanding the state of Rwanda is
spirit injury, a term also derived from CRT, that represents a combination
of physical, emotional, and spiritual harms."° Patricia Williams first contex-
tualized the concept of spirit-murder as related to racism." According to
Williams, the effects of spirit-murder are "as devastating, as costly, and as
psychically obliterating as robbery or assault. 1 12 The term was expanded
in order to explore spirit injuries in other discriminatory situations like
sexism because of the shared nature of the injury: Racism and sexism re-
semble other "offenses against humanity whose structures are so deeply
embedded in culture as to prove extremely resistant to being recognized
5. Lopez, supra note 3, at 193.
6. Id. at 196.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See Part I: The Rwandan Context: Political Power and the Ethnic Question Since Inde-
pendence, in CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTION DEvEopMENT, KIBUYE-RwANDA 28 (Aug. 24,
2001) (comments of Faustin Rutembesa of Rwanda) (unpublished draft of conference
proceedings, on file with ProfessorWing).
10. Patricia Williams, Spirit-Murdering the Messenger: The Discourse of Fingerpointing as the
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as a form of oppression."13 These injuries can ultimately lead to the "slow
death of the psyche, the soul, the identity of the individual."14 On a larger
scale, spirit injury can lead "to the devaluation and destruction of a way of
life or of an entire culture.""5
While the concept of spirit injury has not yet received wide accep-
tance within the U.S. legal community, it is arguably one of the
hermeneutical keys to unlocking much of the mystery surrounding the
"why" question of the Rwandan genocide. Both the Tutsi and Hutu peo-
ples of Rwanda, the Hutus having slaughtered nearly one million Tutsis
during a 100 day period in 1994, are perpetrators and victims of spirit
injuries spanning more than a century.
Hutus were subjected to repeated injurious conduct both physical
and psychological throughout colonial rule, and the Tutsi were assaulted in
multiple ways during the period immediately following independence
and culminating in the genocide. The Hutu extermination of the Tutsi
largely was a product of fear that Tutsis would return to power and rein-
state the abusive regime that characterized the colonial period.
1 6
Furthermore, for the first time, the Hutu were able to ascend to the ranks
of the middle class, a socioeconomic status they were not eager to surren-
der. 7 Decades later, the pain and fear of further physical and spirit injury
resulted in what the Hutu perceived as a defensive slaughter of the Tutsi.
In its post-genocidal state, Rwanda is a country ravaged by devasta-
tion of most every kind. While the physical effects of genocide are easily
recognized in the stacks of bodies and impoverished conditions, there is a
failure to acknowledge that the mass graves contain both individual spirits
and the collective sense of national unity that ideally should inhabit the
country-understanding of what it is to be Rwandan, or "Rwandenness."
In its place, a century of colonialism pitted Hutu against Tutsi through
socially constructed races, destroying a previously shared ancestry that un-
doubtedly reflected more commonality than difference between the Tutsis
and Hutus.
An understanding of where Rwanda has been is necessary before
recommendations are made concerning where it should go, therefore Part
II of this Article provides an in-depth examination of the often disputed
and controversial history of Rwanda and its ethnic groups. Such an in-
quiry is essential to deconstructing the reasons underlying the racism,
ethnic discrimination and hatred that have come to characterize Rwanda.
Specifically, Part II examines pre-colonial, colonial and postcolonial
Rwanda, the genocide, and the post-genocidal state. Particular attention
13. Wing, supra note 2, at 186 (quoting Patricia Williams, supra note 10, at 127-29).
14. Id. at 186.
15. Adrien Katherine Wing & Sylke Merchin, Rape, Ethnicity and Culture: Spirit Injury
from Bosnia to Black America, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. Rav. 1 (1993).
16. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI,WHENVICTIMS BECOME KILLERS 229-231 (2001).
17. See id.
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will be paid to ethnicity, racialization, colonial rule, the regimes of the
First and Second Republics and an analysis of their respective
accompanying constitutions.
Part III provides an overview of democratic theory with an African
context coupled with the problems and challenges democracy poses. This
discussion and its considerations will offer a framework within which the
constitution-building process can occur. Furthermore, Part III will high-
light the principles upon which the constitutional recommendations and
analysis of Part IV can rest, including Cass Sunstein's notions of delibera-
tive democracy, group polarization, deliberating enclaves, incomplete
theorization, transformative constitutions, anticaste, and socioeconomic
rights."'
Part IV examines the current constitution and provides the recom-
mendations for a new constitution. These suggestions have the benefit of
having come, at least in part, from an insider perspective, as many are de-
rived from the Conference on Constitution Development held in Kibuye,
Rwanda in August of 2001 and attended by Professor Wing. Moreover,
the post-apartheid South African Constitution19 was also used as a model
for the recommended provisions, as its history and the challenges facing
those drafting its 1996 constitution are germane to the Rwandan project.
Part IV's emphasis is largely on those provisions relating to molding
Rwanda into a "human rights state"-a state that puts human rights at
the center of its agenda. 21 Specifically, issues of ethnicity and racialization,
women, children, other minority groups, freedom of speech and press,
separation of power, and legitimacy and penetration all receive specific
analysis and recommendations, often drawing from the example of other
countries with similar experiences.
Both the drafting process and the rule of law bring with them the
opportunity to fashion Rwanda into a human rights state. By doing so,
we can hopefully begin to heal the tens of thousands of spirit injuries in-
flicted not only during the genocide but also throughout the past century.
These injuries have wounded men, women and children of every age,
ethnicity, race, and class and have the potential to fuel future violence out
of fear and retribution.
While the present state of affairs is important, patience is necessary:
the process of drafting a constitution and its effectuation may take time.
Moreover, the constitution is but one tool to be utilized in healing
Rwanda. Thus, the scope of this article is limited to the drafting of a new
constitution and its relation to creating a human rights state, and does not
purport to be the cure-all for Rwanda. Nevertheless, with each measure
18. See CASS SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do (2001).
19. S.ArR. CoNST. of 1996.
20. See Makau wa Mutua, Hope and Despair for a New South Africa: The Limits of Rights
Discourse, 10 HAiv. HUM. RTs.J. 63, 64 (1997) (defining a human rights state as "a polity
that is primarily animated by human rights norms").
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taken, the future and those that inhabit it stand to gain immeasurably from
what is achieved today. Indeed, the beginning of the 21st century may
mark the beginning of the healing process for Rwanda.
II.A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. Pre-Colonial Accounts of Rwandan History and
the Struggle to Define the Conflict
According to the traditional definition of an ethnic group-
commonality of ancestry, language, cultural background and geographic
origin-the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa people groups of Rwanda composed a
single ethnicity.21 Indeed, all three groups share a common ancestor, speak
the same language, and partake in similar cultural traditions.22 As a result,
experts have concluded that it is technically improper to distinguish the
Twa,Tutsi and Hutu as three separate ethnicities.
3
According to pre-1994 figures, the Hutus comprised roughly eighty-
five percent of the population, the Tutsis fourteen percent, and the Twa a
mere one percent.24 Nonetheless, history reveals that the dominance of
the Hutus in sheer numbers alone did not translate into control of the
social or political spheres.
2
Those providing an account of Rwandan history generally have
shied away from claiming authoritative knowledge of pre-colonial
Rwanda, largely due to the lack of historical records and conflicting oral
traditions. 26 Nevertheless, traditional accounts often have concurred on
the following facts. The Twa, who are considered descendants of the
region's first inhabitants, were primarily forest dwellers characterized as
pygmy-type people.27 The Tutsi, upon their arrival in the fifteenth century,
elevated themselves above the already present Hutus and established both
a monarchy and feudal system. The Hutu, who were largely farmers,
entered into contract (ubuhake) with the Tutsi whereby the Hutu
promised services in exchange for the use of cattle and land.
21. See Part I: The Rwandan Context, supra note 9, at 28.
22. See id.
23. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM You THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA 48 (1998).
24. BUREAU OF AFmcAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BACKGROUND NOTE:
RWANDA, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/bgn/index.cfm?docid=2861 (last visited Apr. 30,
2002).
25. Id.
26. GOUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 48-49 ("Rwandan history is dangerous. Like all
history, it is a record of successive struggles for power, and to a very large extent power
consists in the ability to make others inhabit your story of their reality .... ").
27. Linda Maguire, Power Ethnicized:The Pursuit of Protection and Participation in Rwanda
and Burundi, 2 BUFF.J. IN't L. 49, 60 (1995).
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Consequently, the relationship established between the Hutu and Tutsi was
essentially one of serfdom.
2
Concerning this arrangement,journalist Philip Gourevitch observed:
"This was the original inequality: cattle are a more valuable asset than
produce, and ... the word Tutsi became synonymous with a political and
economic elite. ' 29 Likewise, Rwandan Professor Faustin Rutembesa
summarized the pre-colonial establishment of ethnicity as follows:
The ethnic issue ... originated during the pre-colonial pe-
riod, under the very profound difference between those
who held power and those who did not. Before coloniza-
tion, the terms Tutsi and Hutu entailed the positions
individuals held in society. The Tutsi were the small aristoc-
racy ... and the Hutu were the masses of the remainder of
the population."
Despite the seemingly rigid social and political structures in place,
Hutus and Tutsis shared a great deal. In fact, the record of pre-colonial
Rwanda is mostly absent of any evidence pointing to a history of hatred
or violence between these groups.31 In addition to speaking the same lan-
guage, the groups shared many cultural traditions of central Africa's
Banyarwanda32 people: use of similar names, adherence to the same relig-
ions, and similar tastes in food, music, and art.
33
The interrelationships between Hutus and Tutsis even extended to
the most intimate of marital and familial relationships, a dynamic made
possible by an emphasis on clan rather than ethnic distinctions. 4 A small
group of Hutus and Tutsis would comprise a chiefdom, headed by a chief
called a Mwami.3s The mixed company would engage in everything from
battle to marriage, the latter permitting a Hutu to be a hereditary Tutsi
and vice versa.36 Nevertheless, by 1860, this hierarchical yet relatively
harmonious monarchy experienced increased polarization when Tutsi
Mwami Kigeri Rwabugir came to power and instituted a regime that
28. See id. at 60-62.
29. GoUREViTCH, supra note 23, at 48.
30. Part I: The Rwandan Context, supra note 9, at 28.
31. Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J.
INT'L L. 365 (1999).
32. Term for people from the Rwanda area in the Rwandan language of Kinya.
33. Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda,
75 N.YU. L. REV. 1221, 1242-43 (2000).
34. GOUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 47-49. "Hutus and Tutsis spoke the same language,
followed the same religion, intermarried, and lived intermingled, without territorial dis-
tinctions, on the same hills, sharing the same social and political culture in small
chiefdoms." Id. at 47.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 47.
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explicitly favored the Tutsi population.37 "Hutu and Tutsi identities took
definition only in relationship to state power. '"38
While this account is believed to be accurate, it is incomplete. There
is a sense that there is far more going on beneath the surface than is pre-
sented by such a historical narrative. Admittedly, scholars have been
unable to correctly characterize the conflict, noting that defining it as
ethnic is not being faithful to traditional definitions of ethnicity.
39
In his book, When Victims Become Killers,40 Mahmood Mamdani
moves beyond the "who" question, namely "who is a Hutu and who is a
Tutsi? ' 41 Instead, he argues that these identities are inextricably linked to
the state, and consequently, are fluid concepts dependent upon how the
state enforces those identities." Furthermore, Mamdani rejects an ap-
proach focusing only on the origins of the Tutsi and Hutu as an
explanation for polarization. 43 Rather, he argues that the colonialists were
responsible for branding the Hutu as indigenous and racializing the Tutsi
as "alien. '" 44 Without a national identity capable of overcoming these con-
structs, these unchecked political identities have resulted in violence . 5
Mamdani's theory that the state constructed races within Rwanda at
the direction of the colonialists fits within the social construction of race
theory defined by Lopez.' Of those characteristics Lopez detailed, many
are directly on point: in Rwanda, the construction of race was directly
attributable to humans, the changes occurred quickly during the first part
of the twentieth century, and the construction occurred relationally by
pitting Tutsi against Hutu.
47
In his critique of prior historical accounts, Mamdani deconstructs
"The Migration Hypothesis," which holds that the Tutsi were not in-
digenous to Rwanda but instead had immigrated to Rwanda." The
theory is woven together with four distinct threads, each positing that the
Tutsi were indeed a separate, geographically distinct people group based
on differences in phenotype, disparities in genotype, findings of cultural
anthropology based on memories, and evidence in archaeological and
37. Id. at 48-49.
38. Id. at 50.
39. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 48; Part I:The Rwandan Context, supra note 9, at
28.
40. See generally MAmDANi, supra note 16.





46. See Lopez, supra note 3, at 196.
47. Id.
48. See MonDAi, supra note 16, at 43-50 (providing a full account and critique of the
theory).
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linguistic source materials.49 Mamdani notes that while there may have
been some differences in physical characteristics or genotype, it can
largely be attributed to natural or social selection.5 ° For example, insofar as
the Tutsi maintained a privileged position in society, diets rich in meat and
milk could be responsible for the differences in height between Tutsi and
Hutu.s5
Moreover, historical accounts once touting the sharp divide between
the agricultural Hutus and pastoral Tutsis were softened in light of evi-
dence that the line of separation was permeable (there were pastoral Hutu
and agricultural Tutsi). 52 Without entirely denying the possibility that pas-
toral groups were immigrating. to the region in the fifteenth century,
Mamdani argues that the line drawn between the pastoral Tutsi and agri-
cultural Hutu was often blurred. In fact, ancestors of the Hutu possessed
cattle prior to the time Tutsi are said to have immigrated to the area.1
3
Nevertheless, concurring in traditional historical accounts, Mamdani
agrees that the two groups generally "spoke the same language, lived on
the same hills, and had more or less the same culture .... But they had yet
to become one people." 4 Thus, while the line between the groups was
somewhat porous, including practices like intermarriage between Tutsi
and Hutu, separatism did exist.5
Mamdani also explores the organization of kin groups, the smallest
being a lineage and the largest called a clan. 6 The lineage consisted of
only four or five generations and was never composed of a mix of Tutsi
and Hutu. On the other hand, the clan was much larger and usually
mixed. However, a sense of separateness still characterized the clan despite
its mixed heritage: "Hutu and Tutsi clansmen 'did not exhibit any solidar-
ity at all and behaved towards each other as complete strangers.' ,s
From these observations, two theories emerged regarding the Tutsi
and Hutu. One argues that there is essentially no difference between
them other than socioeconomic; the other argues that the groups stem
from separate origins. 8 However, Mamdani synthesizes the weak form of
each view, seeing no need to adopt the strong form of either side: "[A]
hypothesis suggesting numerous migrations stretched out over centuries
in no way rules out a weak version of social selection whereby rulers in-
49. Id. at 43-44.
50. Id. at 44-45.
51. Id. at 45.
52. Id. at 50-51.
53. Id. at 51.
54. Id. at 52.
55. Id. at 53.
56. Id. at 54.
57. Id. at 55 (quoting JAcQUES J. MAQUET, THE PREMISE OF INEQUALITY IN RWANDA: A
STUDY OF POLrrICAL RELATIONS IN A CENTRAL AFRIcAN KINGDOM 46 (1961)).
58. Id. at 57.
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breed and reproduce on the basis of notions of social selectivity and
physical beauty." 9
Although Hutu and Tutsi did share a single cultural community, the
process by which Rwanda became a state under Tutsi Mwami Kigeri
Rwabugir was largely responsible for polarizing the political identities of
the Hutu and Tutsi. 6° Particularly telling of the damage done during this
process is the change in patron-client relationships organized by the mon-
archy through the serfdom-like arrangement. What began as payments by
Hutu to Tutsi in exchange for protection culminated in nonreciprocal
relationships where labor was demanded of Hutus merely because they
occupied the land.61 Power imbalances such as these sustained and gradu-
ally increased the sense of separation between the Hutu and Tutsi.
6
1
Ultimately, Mamdani concludes that it is inappropriate to call the
differences between the Hutus and Tutsis an ethnic one, a proposition as-
serted by previous scholars despite the inability to characterize the
situation as anything else.63 Mamdani casts this pre-colonial division in
terms of political identities fashioned by the state. 6' Because the Tutsis, led
by Mwami Rwabugiri, held the power and the Hutus were increasingly
subjected to unreasonable payments resembling serfdom, the polarization
of the groups was essentially a political distinction, not an ethnic one.
65
Finally, Mamdani reminds us that despite these distinctions, social mobility
still existed between Hutu and Tutsi prior to colonialism: although bot-
tom rung Tutsis were never subject to the tributes required of Hutu, it was
possible for Hutus to ascend through ennoblement or intermarriage.
66
The following section explores the changes that occurred to the
Hutu and Tutsi identities under colonial rule. Utilizing Mamdani's para-
digm, these identities were largely political and became racialized under
colonialism, a process that ultimately solidified the bipolarity of the two
groups and resulted in the first explosion of violence between Hutus and
Tutsis. Likewise, the social construction of race theory is evidenced in the
way human beings racialized the Tutsi rather quickly by relationally pit-
ting them against the Hutu.
59. Id. at 58.
60. Id. at 74.
61. Id. at 66.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 73.
64. Id. at 74.
65. Id. at 75.
66. Id. at 74.
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B. The Colonial Period
1.The Traditional Account's Reliance on Ethnicity Alone
An examination of the colonization of Rwanda provides insights
into the gradual escalation of hatred between the Hutus and Tutsis. The
Germans are regarded as the first Europeans to visit Rwanda, and their
initial impressions seemed to hasten the stratification already congealing:
the Tutsi were clearly aristocratic and sophisticated compared to the
Hutus, because the Tutsi physical characteristics-towering height, narrow
facial features and light complexion-most mirrored those of Europeans.
67
Until the Belgians expelled the Germans in 1915, the Germans held
Rwanda and Burundi as provinces, lauding favor upon the Tutsis, thereby
widening the separation between the Hutu and Tutsi.68
Even after World War I and the subsequent Belgian rule of Rwanda,
the favoritism extended to the Tutsis continued, including advancement to
positions of prestige and trust. 69 With this privilege came power. Bel-
gium's authority is described by Mamdani as a hybrid of direct and
indirect rule: Belgium granted the Tutsi the indirect power to rule (and
punish) the Hutu, but the Hutu hatred toward the Tutsi was characteristic
of direct rule where the oppressed direct their anger toward the visible
oppressor." However, the real devastation was in the damaging focus on
ethnic differences.
It was during Belgian rule that "Belgian administrators further rein-
forced the Territory's ethnic distinctions and corresponding hierarchy
when they began requiring that an individual's ethnic group be specified
on identity cards." 7 In the educational arena, Catholic schools freely and
blatantly preferred Tutsi students at the expense of Hutu children.72 In
employment, Hutus were subjected to forced labor, where their Tutsi
brother became a brutal taskmaster.73 As recounted by a Tutsi man much
later, the Belgian threats made to the Tutsi may account for some of the
rough treatment: "You whip the Hutu or we will whip you."
7 4
The short term consequences of favoring Tutsis and requiring eth-
nicity identification cards included increased polarization between the
67. Id. at 44.
68. BUREAu OF AmcA AFFAIRs, supra note 24.
69. Maguire, supra note 27, at 63.
70. MAMDAI, supra note 16, at 100 (noting that Belgium "constructed the colonized
along a majority/minority axis, an indigenous majority and a so-called nonindigenous
minority").
71. UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996,
10 UNITED NATIONS BLUEBOOK SERIES 8 (1996) [hereinafter "DEP'T OF PUB. INFo."].
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ethnicities and the bestowal of privileges upon the Tutsis in the educa-
tional, employment and civil administration systems.75 The long term
consequences would not fully manifest themselves until a 100 day period
in 1994, those identification cards ultimately aiding the Hutus in identify-
ing fleeing Tutsis at roadblocks and checkpoints so that they could be
slaughtered on the spot. 6
2.The Social Construction of Race:
Colonial Racialization of the Tutsi
Mamdani posits that the colonialists essentially racialized the Tutsis
through their reliance on the Hamitic Hypothesis." Colonialists believed
that there were two types of people with black skin: Hamites and Ne-
groes."8 Hamites were held to be descendants of Noah's cursed son Ham,
and were responsible for all civilizing influences in Africa; they were
"[c]aucasians under a black skin.""9 On the other hand, the native, indige-
nous population were the Negroes, and the Hamites were responsible for
civilizing the Negroes."0 At this time, the Hutu were merely regarded as
indigenous rather than "Hutu. ' 's l
This was not merely an intellectual theory, but rather was institution-
alized in a way that this racialization could be realized.8 2 He attributes this
process to a cooperative effort between the Catholic Church and the co-
lonial state. 3 As stated above, all institutions were infected with this
racialization, including schools, state administrative agencies, taxation, and
the Church."'
The process of racialization culminated with the census of 1933-34,
which "constructed the Tutsi as nonindigenous and the Hutu as indige-
nous. By constructing a distinction between the alien Tutsi and
indigenous Hutu, the Tutsi came to be defined as a race-the Hamitic
race--different from the Hutu, who were viewed as indigenous Bantu."'
Moreover, the Belgian colonialists only saw the Hutu and Tutsi as distinct
races, paying no attention to ethnic groups. 6
75. DEP'T OF PUB. IrFO., supra note 71, at 8.
76. Id. at 37-38.
77. MAMDANi, supra note 16, at 82.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 82, 101.
81. Id. at 99.
82. Id. at 87.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 99.
86. Id.
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This racialization went hand in hand with the form of Belgium rule
imposed upon Rwanda. 7 The Belgian colonialists governed through a
hybrid of direct and indirect rule: the colonialists used Tutsi chiefs to gov-
ern over the people, a practice which "legally fractured natives into so
many ethnicities, and this mitigated the tension between the colonizer
and the colonized. 8 8 Thus, the colonialists, in constructing an alien race
that could be used to rule over the indigenous population, ultimately cre-
ated enmity between the Tutsi and Hutu. Hutus came to see the Tutsis as
"the other"-an alien race imposing their rule upon the natives. 9
This process provides a chilling example of the social construction of
race.9" Consistent with CRT's social construction of race theory, the
process of racializing the Tutsi minority as outsiders and forcing them to
be the visible oppressor of the indigenous majority was carried out de-
ceptively with the intervention of human hands (Belgian) and was
accomplished by manipulating the relationship between Hutus and Tutsis.
Thus, this hybrid form of direct-indirect rule ultimately served to create
an unprecedented distance between Tutsi and Hutu.
3.The End of Colonialism
The flourishing of the Tutsis under Belgium came to an end during
the Revolution of November 1959.91 Mamdani chiefly looks for the
causes of the Revolution in the colonial period, and not in pre-colonial
history.92 To summarize the colonial period, the Tutsi embraced Belgium's
racialization of them as non-indigenous largely because they were granted
positions of power and exempted from the labor requirements imposed
on the Hutu.9 3 However, a Hutu counter-elite was forming that eventu-
ally led the Revolution.94
United Nations (UN) decolonization missions began as early as 1949
and local elections were held in 1953. 95 During the 1950's, Belgium be-
gan to promote democracy, but the Tutsi, who viewed such reforms as a
threat, opposed this trend.96 However, the Hutu saw democracy as major-
ity rule, and they constituted the majority in Rwanda. "This was what
passed for democratic thought in Rwanda: Hutus had the numbers." '97
87. Id. at 100.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 102.
90. See supra Part I.
91. MAMDANI, supra note 16, at 104.
92. Id. at 105.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 106.
95. Id. at 114-115.
96. BuREAu OF AFmcAN AFFAIRS, supra note 24.
97. GOtREVVTCH, supra note 23, at 58.
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Nonetheless, Hutu efforts to become involved were ultimately thwarted
by the power retained by the Tutsis. 9 From these experiences in the ensu-
ing years, the Hutu realized the Tutsi could only be uprooted by political
power.
99
The initial sparks of the Revolution began in the summer of 1959.
Tensions escalated over the Mwami (chief coup that occurred on July 28,
1959, in which the Mwami died without an heir and his half brother was
immediately placed in the position of the new Mwami without colonial
consultation."° This set off an outbreak of violence between the Tutsi po-
litical party, Union Nationale Rwandaise (UNAR), and the Hutu party,
PARMEHUTU. 1°1
Belgium ultimately intervened and declared a state of emergency. 102
However, rather than merely restore order, Belgium, arguing the need for
stability, began replacing Tutsi chiefs with Hutus °3 This change in alle-
giance from Tutsi to Hutu was likely due to the Hutus' receptiveness to
Belgium's promotion of democratic reforms.1 0 4 Gradually, Hutu chiefs
came to control most of the localities, and on January 28, 1961, this cul-
minated in a gathering in the town of Gitarama where Hutu officials
declared the end of the monarchy and established a republic."5 This com-




An ensuing wave of violence left hundreds of Tutsis dead and sent
thousands more fleeing to neighboring countries. 7 A United Nations
report concluded that approximately 120,000 Rwandans, most of whom
were Tutsis, had become refugees in the countries surrounding Rwanda."'5
It was also the first ever-documented case of systematic political violence
between the Hutu and Tutsi.'0 9 Finally, on July 1, 1962, Rwanda was
granted independence after the General Assembly ended the trusteeship
98. MAMDANI, SUpra note 16, at 115.
99. Id. at 116.
100. Id. at 123.
101. Id. at 120-121.
102. Id. at 124.
103. Id. at 124.
104. See Maguire, supra note 27, at 64.
105. MAmDroi, supra note 16, at 124.
106. Id.
107. DEP'T OF PUB. INFo., supra note 71, at 8-9. Even in the years immediately preced-
ing independence, the number of refugees residing in surrounding countries reached as
high as 150,000. Id. at 10.
108. Id. at 9. These exiles in turn became militarized in an effort to return to power in
Rwanda. During the 1960's, these armed refugees engaged in ten confrontations. Id. at 10.
See also infra Part II.C.3 (discussing the rise of the Rwandese Patriotic Front, some of
whom were undoubtedly refugees from thirty years earlier).
109. GOUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 59.
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of Belgium. '° Unfortunately, "the new order ... was merely the old order
stood on its head." '
The Revolution of 1959 constituted more than a mere transfer of
power." 2 Rather, it brought about three distinct changes: first, a change in
representation occurred in terms of both a shift from minority to major-
ity rule and by the placement of power with the "indigenous" rather than
alien population; second, elections were instituted at the national and local
levels; finally, social reforms were carried out with the effect of abolishing
practices like forced labor.'" These changes and their effects are the sub-
ject of the following section.
C. The Post-Colonial/Pre-Genocide Period
1.The First Republic
Rwanda became independent on July 1, 1962.114 The First Republic
was led by President Gregoire Kayibanda.110 While he ensured that the
Tutsi were extracted from politics, he allowed them to maintain their po-
sitions and access to most other spheres.'1 6 Nevertheless, in the aftermath
of the Revolution, Rwanda was a Hutu state first and foremost.11 7 This
was maintained by retaining the view of racialization put forth by the co-
lonialists: Tutsi were aliens, outsiders, a different race, and this distinction
justified their treatment as resident aliens."8 However, despite efforts of
the First Republic to favor the Hutus and establish a Hutu republic, there
was a growing dissatisfaction with the regime. 9
The First Republic did draft and adopt the first constitution of the
independent state-the Constitution of November 24, 1962. '20 Primarily,
the Constitution abolished the Mwami regime2 (a functional monarchy)
and established a "democratic, social and sovereign Republic."
1 22
The Constitution also included a limited equality clause, ensuring
the "equality of all its citizens without distinction of race, origin, sex or
110. BuREAu OF AFRIcAN AFFAIRS, supra note 24.
111. GouREviTCH, supra note 23, at 61.
112. MAMDANI, supra note 16, at 133.
113. Id. at 133-134.
114. BmiaREu OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, supra note 24.
115. M~mDANI, supra note 16, at 134.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 135.
119. Id.
120. RWANDA CONST. of 1962.
121. Id. at tit. 1, art. 2.
122. Id. at tit. I, art. 1.
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religion.""' 3 Under Title II, "The Public Liberties" are given further defi-
nition, encompassing the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Man.
1 24
Article 16 expanded the equality clause to include race, clan, color, sex
and religion, and article 17 abolished the "privileges of caste." 2 ' Freedoms
to express opinion, access information, and to associate were generally
protected.26 The right to privacy in correspondence, right to travel, prop-
erty rights, and domestic privacy were also guaranteed. 27
The Rwandan Constitution explicitly provided recognition and pro-
tection of the family, with parents given the right to raise their children.2 2
Although men and women were recognized as being equal in the eyes of
the law, "[t]he man was the natural head of the family.' 129 The state ac-
knowledged responsibility for education, required primary education, and
pledged aid to pay for education insofar as the parents were unable to do
so.1 30 Military service was also required of males over eighteen. 3' Though
mentioned earlier in the Constitution, freedom of conscience and religion
were again explicitly guaranteed. 3 Important for the Hutu in breaking
from the old regime, forced labor was abolished and the right to work was
recognized, with the accompanying right to join a union.
1 33
Structurally, the Constitution separated the three branches of gov-
ernment-executive, legislative, and judicial-with the respective highest
offices of each being the President, National Assembly, and the Supreme
Court. 34 The President was the supreme Head of State, and was to be
assisted by his ministers. 3 However, the President alone answered to the
National Assembly."6
The National Assembly consisted of members titled "Deputies to the
National Assembly."1 37 The deputies then elected a President or Vice-
President to preside over the National Assembly,1 3 which was to meet
123. Id. at tit. I, art. 3.
124. Id. at tit. II, art. 13.
125. Id. at tit. II, arts. 16-17.
126. Id. at tit. II, arts. 18-20.
127. Id. at tit. II, arts. 21-24.
128. Id. at tit. II, art. 24.
129. Id. at tit. II, art. 30.
130. Id. at tit. II, arts. 31-34.
131. Id. at tit. II, art. 35.
132. Id. at tit. II, arts. 37-38.
133. Id. at tit. II, arts. 40-42.
134. Id. at tit. III, arts. 45-46.
135. Id. at tit. IV, arts. 51,62.
136. Id. at tit. IV, art. 68.
137. Id. at tit.V, art. 73.
138. Id. at tit.V, art. 76.
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twice a year,'39 and was responsible for passing the budget" and other
laws with a majority vote.1
4 '
The Constitution organized the judiciary as follows: cantonal tribu-
nals, courts of the first instance, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme
Court.1 42 The Supreme Court was then divided into the Department of
Courts and Tribunals, the Court of Appeal, the Constitutional Court, the
Council of State, and the Court of Accounts. 4 3 Finally, the President of
Rwanda was to appoint the President of the Supreme Court.'4
2.The Second Republic
In 1973, Hutu Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana came to power
after a successful military coup d'itat under the Mouvement revolution-
naire national pour le d~veloppement (MRND) party.'5 This time, there
existed a marked change in the way the Tutsi were viewed. The political
identity of the Tutsi was now that of an ethnic group rather than a race,
conferring the status of a people indigenous to Rwanda.' 46 Ultimately, this
meant that Tutsi were permitted to reenter the political sphere, though the
Second Republic limited them to a degree proportional to their "minor-
ity status."'
14 7
In fact, this regime was very interested in employing affirmative ac-
tion and quotas to redistribute power in proportion to Hutu and Tutsi
presence in the larger society.'48 However, it granted representation solely
on the basis of the groups' percentage in the population. ' 9 For example,
in the education arena, school admittance was made dependent on these
quotas: the Hutu were guaranteed at least eighty-five percent of available
spots, the Tutsi were entitled to somewhere between ten to fifteen percent,
and the Twa were given one percent.'
Besides the extensive reorganizing effort, the Second Republic also
adopted a new constitution on December 17, 1978.' The Constitution
was a synthesis of provisions from three different countries' constitutions:
139. Id. at tit.V, art. 80.
140. Id. at tit. V, art. 81.
141. Id. at tit.VI, art. 89.
142. Id. at tit.VII, art. 99.
143. Id. at tit.VII, art. 103.
144. Id. at tit.VII, art. 104.
145. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 71, at 10.
146. MAMDANi, supra note 16, at 138.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 138-39.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 139.
151. RWANDA CONST. of 1978.
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France, Belgium and Tanzania." 2 The French model was relied upon for
establishing the government's structure."3 Interestingly, the drafters drew
upon Belgium for human rights provisions.5 ' Lastly, they looked to Tan-
zania for an example of how to organize a single-party state."' 5
Consequently, following the Tanzanian model, the country was divided up
into ten prefectures and then into 143 communes, each made up of some
30,000 people."6 This system of organization ultimately facilitated the
genocide nearly twenty years later.57
Among its specific provisions, the Constitution recognized those
fundamental liberties identified in the Declaration of Human Rights.158
Compared to its predecessor, the equality clause was further expanded to
include "race, color, origin, ethnic group, clan affiliation, sex, opinion, re-
ligion, or social position.""1 9 Freedoms of worship, conscience, expression,
association, and travel were carried over from the previous Constitution.'60
Likewise, rights to privacy in personal life, communications and residences
were guaranteed.'
The family continued to receive recognition, though a provision de-
claring the husband head of household was absent.162 Freedom of
education was also guaranteed, and the compulsory primary education
was now free of charge for those children of appropriate age.1 63 The re-
mainder of the Constitution laid out the structure of government, largely
the same as the prior Constitution, though changing the name of the Na-
tional Assembly to the National Development Council.
1 6
During the next fifteen years, Rwanda experienced some degree of
success in developing its infrastructure.1 65 However, as the 1980's came to
a close, the Second Republic began to experience serious problems
stemming from both internal and external factors.'* Externally, the drop
in coffee prices by fifty percent during the summer of 1989 and the




156. Id. at 144.
157. Id. ("the administrative machinery of the local state was key to organizing the
series of massacres that constituted the genocide of 1994").
158. RWANDA CONST. of 1978, ch. II, art. 12.
159. Id. at ch. III, art. 16.
160. Id at ch. I1, arts. 18-21.
161. Id. at ch. III, art. 22.
162. Id. at ch. III, arts. 24-25.
163. Id. at ch. III, arts. 26-27.
164. Id. at ch. III, ch. 2, art. 51.
165. See MAMDANI, supra note 16, at 144-45 (discussing Rwanda's economic growth
throughout the 1980's).
166. Id. at 147.
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military costs associated with the Rwandese Patriotic Front invasion in
1990 (described below) placed great demands upon the country.
16
3.The Rise of the Rwandese Patriotic
Front and Its Subsequent Invasion
By the late 1980s, some 480,000 Rwandans were refugees in
neighboring countries, which included about half of the Tutsi popula-
tion.168 In 1988, a group of mostly Tutsi refugees in Uganda formed the
Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), whose goals were to secure the "repa-
triation of Rwandans in exile and the reform of the Government of
Rwanda, including political power-sharing" ' 169 By July of 1990, an agree-
ment on repatriation was made between Uganda and Rwanda.'
7
1
President Habyarimana then declared that a multiparty system would be
instituted in Rwanda.'
7'
Nevertheless, despite these apparent advancements, the RPF began
an invasion into Rwanda from its headquarters in Uganda on October 1,
1990.172 The battle lasted until July 31, 1992, when a cease-fire halted the
two-year conflict that had cost thousands of lives."" The Rwandan gov-
ernment and the RPF then began to engage in political talks, which
culminated in the signing of the Arusha Peace Accords on August 4, 1993,
an agreement guaranteeing power-sharing between the two factions. 74 To
aid in the enforcement of the agreement, the Security Council unani-
mously authorized the formation of the United Nations Assistance
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) in October of 1993, and by the end of
December, 1,260 troops had been deployed.'
7
According to Mamdani, "the October [1990] invasion [by the RPF]
was more a response to developments within the region than those inside
Rwanda.' '176 Despite their numbers, Rwanda refugees in Uganda suffered
mistreatment and oppression, and Mamdani compares their situation to
that of Palestinian refugees in the Middle East-"once a refugee, always a
refugee."' 7 7 "They were the butt of popular prejudice and official dis-
crimination, the readily available explanation for any situation difficult to
167. Id.
168. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 71, at 11. Note that some of these had been exiles
since the Revolution of 1959. See supra Part II.B.3 and note 108.
169. DEP'T OF PUB. INFo., supra note 71,at 12.
170. Id.
171. BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRs, supra note 24.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Maguire, supra note 27, at 57.
175. DEP'T or PUB. INFO., supra note 71,at 27-28.
176. MAmDAti, supra note 16, at 159.
177. Id. at 165.
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explain, from poverty to sabotage."'78 Thus the Rwandan refugees inhab-
iting Uganda, having suffered spirit injuries, represented a large "armed
and political force." 17 9
The first organization of these refugees was the Rwandese Alliance for
National Unity (RANU) in Uganda.' ° However, as the issue of indigeneity
became a key issue in both Rwanda and Uganda, it brought with it the
question of entitlement: "Who was entitled to justice in the postcolonial
period. Who was the postcolonial subject?"'8 The consequence of the
emphasis on indigeneity was the continued oppression in Uganda as in
Rwanda of those who were not indigenous.'82
In response to repression of refugees and attempts to expel them
during the mid-1980's, many Rwandan youth joined the Ugandan
National Resistance Army (NRA), a guerrilla group intent on overthrow-
ing the Ugandan regime. 8 3 The NRA was finally successful in its battle,
and came to power in Uganda in January of 1986.84 The NRA's politics
were meant to change the postcolonial favoritism lavished on the indige-
nous by enforcing a distinction that hinged on residency rather than on
descent.'85 However, these good intentions ultimately were unrealized.
8 6
The RPF was born because Rwandans continued to face
discrimination in the NRA based on descent despite a policy decision
that held otherwise.'87 Not surprisingly, RPF leadership was dominated by
Tutsis, though the head of the RPF was Hutu.8 8 The RPF did not act
until a dispute between ranchers (Ugandan citizens) and squatters
(Rwandan refugees) ended in such a way that it favored only Ugandan
citizens and left no provision for Rwandan refugees, signaling the latter's
disenfranchisement.
8 9
The view that deteriorating conditions in Uganda precipitated the
RPF invasion of Rwanda is held not only by Mamdani; Katenta-Apuli,
Uganda's ambassador to the U.S., cited the imposition of "the prohibi-
tion[s] against nonindigenous Banyarwanda owning land or holding state
positions" as cause for the invasion and return to Rwanda. 9 ' However,
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 166.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 168-169.
184. Id. at 170.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 175.
187. Id. Note that the RPF was nothing more than RANU "rechristened." Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 182.
190. Id. at 182-83 (citing Letter to Human Rights Watch,August 26, 1993).
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Uganda did agree to aid the RPF in its invasion on the condition that it
never return.91
4.The Current Constitution
Despite the RPF conflict, Rwanda adopted their present Constitu-
tion on May 30, 1991.192 Its Title I provisions concern general
housekeeping matters of "The Republic," defining the form of govern-
ment; flag and language; status of political parties; suffrage; and division of
country into prefectures and communes.
19 3
Title II brings us into the realm of "Public Liberties."'194 Of note, the
equality clause declares equality of all citizens "without any discrimina-
tion, especially with respect to race, color, origin, ethnic background, clan,
sex, opinion, religion, or social status.' 90 Article 16 abolishes all slavery,
and articles 17 through 20 guarantee freedom of religion, expression, con-
science, association, and assembly.9 6 Citizens also have the right to move
and settle, the right to privacy, and an inviolable right to private prop-
erty.197 As with prior constitutions, family is recognized and protected,
with parents having the right to raise their children. 198 Liberty of teaching
is guaranteed, and primary education continues to be both mandatory
and free. 9 Additionally, the rights to workjoin a union, and be protected
from "excessively punishing hard labor" are all protected.
2
00
The powers of government are delineated in Title III of the Consti-
tution. In general, the various powers are separated.2"' The President is the
ceremonial Head of State and the Supreme Chief of the Armed Forces. 212
He can declare a state of siege or state of emergency after consulting with
Government, the Constitutional Court and the Bureau of the National
Assembly (all three of which are discussed below). 23 In addition, he is re-
sponsible for appointing the Prime Minister, who is the head of the
Government.2 4 The Government is charged with determining and con-
191. Id. at 183.
192. RWANDA CONsT. of 1991.
193. Id. at tit. I, arts. 1-11.
194. Id. tit. I, arts. 12-33.
195. Id. at tit. II, art. 16.
196. Id. at tit. II, arts. 17-20.
197. Id. at tit. II, arts. 21-23.
198. Id. at tit. II, art. 24.
199. Id. at tit. II, arts. 26-27.
200. Id. at tit. II, arts. 29-32.
201. Id. at tit. I1, art. 34.
202. Id. at tit. III, ch. I, § I, art. 45.
203. Id. at tit. III, ch. I, § I, art. 48.
204. Id. at tit. III, ch. I, I, art. 44.
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ducting the Nation's policies. 2 ' The armed forces are entrusted to it, and
it is accountable to the National Assembly.2 6 The Prime Minister is re-
sponsible for presenting the Government's programs to the Assembly, as
well as delegating assignments to the Ministers and Secretaries of State.0 7
All of these officials are accountable to both the President and the Na-
tional Assembly.208
Legislative power is vested in the National Assembly, which is com-
posed of "Deputies of the National Assembly.' '209 Among the
determinations and initiatives made by the Assembly, it votes upon the
financial laws providing resources for the State and votes on a yearly
budget.210 Voting typically requires a simple majority.
2"
The judiciary is a hierarchical system made up of the following
courts from lowest to highest: canton courts, courts of the first instance,
courts of appeal, and the Court of Cassation.2 1 2 The Constitutional Court
is composed of a combination of the Court of Cassation and the Council
of State.2"3
The next section of this Article discusses the genocide that occurred
during a 100-day period in 1994. According to Mamdani, the RPF's in-
vasion alerted the Hutu that Tutsi power was perhaps not a thing of the
past, and this conjured up threatening images of forced labor, mistreat-
ment and expulsion from the middle class.2 14 Consequently, the concept of
"Hutu power" was born and began to reestablish the racialization of the
Tutsi as alien.2 1 1 In essence, the Hutu's old physical and spirit injuries were
reopened and provided the initiative to mobilize against the Tutsi.
D. The Genocide
1. Making the Genocide "Thinkable"
Among his aims, Mamdani has sought to make sense of the incom-
prehensible "by making the genocide thinkable." '16 The prospect of the
Tutsis (in the form of the RPF) waging war and coming back into power
was disturbing to the Hutu, whether for fear of forced labor or reclaiming
205. Id. at tit. III, ch. I, I I, art. 50.
206. Id.
207. Id. at tit. III, ch. I, § IL, art. 51.
208. Id. at tit. II, ch. I, § IL, art. 54.
209. Id. at tit. III, ch. II, § I, art. 58.
210. Id. at tit. III, ch. II, § II, arts. 76-77.
211. Id. at tit. ILL, ch. II, § II, art. 73.
212. Id. at tit. III, ch. IV, art. 88.
213. Id. at tit. III, ch. IV, art. 90.
214. MAmDANI, supra note 16, at 189-90.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 195.
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land.117 Consequently, a propaganda effort was launched following the
RPF invasion, including a telling publication called the "Hutu Ten Com-
mandments," which "forbade Hutu from entering into a wide range of
relations with Tutsi, whether in sex, business, or state affairs. ' 21 8 Indeed,
one resident's observations reveal the degree to which the Hutu were
inflamed: "They hear over and over that the Tutsis are out to kill them,
and that is reality. So they act not out of hate as fear. They think they
have only the choice to kill or be killed.1
21 9
As stated earlier, a peace process began between the RPF and Hutu
opposition parties that culminated in the Arusha Accords of 1993.220 The
RPF appeared to come away from the process victorious: first, a provision
was included on merging the two armies; second, the Ministry of the In-
terior was given to the RPF; third, Tutsi were given reserved seats in
parliament and permitted to exclude the extreme Hutu Power group; and
fourth, a provision was included that guaranteed the right of return to all
refugees. 2 1 Unbeknownst to the RPF, the Hutu would use this RPF vic-
tory as evidence that the Tutsis were indeed taking over and that the Hutu
"were in imminent danger. ' 222
Mamdani also points to the experiences of the Hutu in neighboring
Burundi as bearing heavily upon the Rwanda Hutu . 23 In 1972 around
200,000 Hutu schoolchildren and intellectuals were slaughtered under
Tutsi rule in Burundi.224 However, change later swept the land with the
institution of a "one-person-one-vote" principle within a multiparty sys-
tem.22' Nevertheless, in late October of 1993, an all-Tutsi army turned
against the Hutu dominated government and murdered the Hutu Presi-
dent.226 Consequently, after violence broke out throughout the country,
some 200,000 Burundi Hutus fled into Rwanda.
2 27
Gourevitch notes that the state of Rwanda at the time of its 100-day
genocide was somewhat paradoxical:
In 1994, Rwanda was regarded in much of the rest of the
world as the exemplary instance of the chaos and anarchy
associated with collapsed states. In fact, the genocide was the
product of order, authoritarianism, decades of modern
217. Id. at 190-91.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 191 (quoting Benedicte Ndagijimana).
220. Id. at 211.
221. Id. at 210-11.
222. Id. at 211.




227. Id. at 215-16.
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political theorizing and indoctrination, and one of the most
meticulously administered states in history.
28
Similarly, Faustin Rutembesa observed: "[T]oday we must know that
something was broken and the Rwandans were not able to fix it.... [T]he
government of 1994 was the most terrible manifestation of that thing that
was broken. '" 229 Thus, despite the appearance of a highly efficient admini-
stration, the Rwandan government of 1994 was corrupt, malevolent, and
fundamentally flawed.
The genocide consequently became "thinkable." After considering
the colonialists' racialization of the Tutsi, the history of forced Hutu labor
under Tutsi-rule, the Hutu Revolution and subsequent attainment of
middle class status, the Hutu's defeat at the hands of the Tutsi-dominated
RPF, and the experiences of the Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi, it is plausible
if not probable, that the April 1994 plane crash that killed Rwanda's and
Burundi's Presidents was not a random spark that set off an incomprehen-
sible genocide. Rather, the crash merely removed the last roadblock
restraining Hutu Power: Rwandan President Habyarimana had been fa-
cilitating a power-sharing arrangement, which was now unthinkable to
many Hutu.130 Indeed, the President had begun the Second Republic by
recasting the Tutsi as an indigenous ethnicity rather than a foreign race.23
However, Hutu Power had reverted to the notion that the Tutsi was a ra-
cialized enemy and decided they would never again be permitted to
inflict both physical and spirit injuries upon the Hutu.
2. Retelling and Remembering the Genocide
The rumblings of genocide came as early as January of 1994.232 Ro-
meo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, received information from an
anonymous but high-ranking Hutu government official describing the
"rapid arming and training of local militias." 233 Dallaire subsequently sent
a fax to the United Nations Headquarters in New York reporting the
alarming news that "Hutu extremists 'had been ordered to register all the
Tutsi in Kigali.' "234 Furthermore, Dallaire relayed the grave conclusion
228. GoUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 95.
229. The Evolution of Powers in Rwanda: Distortions between Constitutional Provisions and
Institutional Practice, in CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTION DEVELOPMENT, KIBuYE-RWANDA 34,
37 (Aug. 24, 2001) (comments of Faustin Rutembesa of Rwanda) (unpublished draft of
conference proceedings, on file with ProfessorWing).
230. MAMDANI, supra note 16, at 216.
231. Id. at 99.
232. Samantha Power, Bystanders to Genocide: Why the United States Let the Rwandan Trag-
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reached by the anonymous informant (who was given the name Jean-
Pierre): "He suspects it is for their extermination.... [The] [e]xample he
gave was that in 20 minutes his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis." 23s
Jean-Pierre even went so far as to describe how the Hutu would kill
many of the Belgian peacekeepers within Rwanda so that Belgium would
evacuate its personnel.236 Unfortunately, the mazes of United Nations bu-
reaucracy ultimately ignored the warning.
37
The spark that ignited the ensuing 100 days of genocide occurred on
April 6, 1994.238 While President Habyarimana was returning from a
peace conference with President Ntaryamira of Burundi, their plane was
shot down, killing all aboard.2 39 Although the group responsible for these
assassinations was never identified, many believe that Hutus were behind
it.240 Upset with President Habyarimana's decision to power-share with
the Tutsis, they assassinated him and began the genocide.2 41 Within a half
hour of the crash, Hutu militiamen and the gendarmerie-the Hutu con-
trolled army-erected checkpoints and roadblocks where travelers were
required to present the identity cards disclosing their ethnicity.2 42 Those
identified as Tutsi were immediately murdered by the side of the road.
24 3
As predicted by Jean-Pierre, on the second day of the genocide, the
Hutu brutally murdered ten Belgian peacekeepers protecting the Hutu
moderate Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana.2" Although the U.S.
had safely evacuated all of its people, Belgium asked for cover from the
U.S. while it sought to remove its troops.245 By April 19, the Belgian
withdrawal was complete, and two days later, the Security Council re-
duced UNAMIR's troops to a mere 270 after receiving pressure from the
U.S.
246
Even without the Belgian presence, Dallaire was aware of the posi-
tive effects a mere 2,100 troops could have had.2 47 Because Hutus were
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and peacekeepers, each one of these troops was crucial to saving lives. 248
Samantha Power, in her article Bystanders to Genocide, relays this story: "At
the Hotel des Mille Collines ten peacekeepers and four UN military ob-
servers helped to protect several hundred civilians sheltered there for the
duration of the crisis. "249
Despite retaining 503 troops, Dallaire was well aware of what they
faced:
My force was standing knee-deep in mutilated bodies, sur-
rounded by the guttural moans of dying people, looking
into the eyes of children bleeding to death with their
wounds burning in the sun and being invaded by maggots
and flies .... I found myself walking through villages where
the only sign of life was a goat, or a chicken, or a songbird,
as all the people were dead, their bodies being eaten by vo-
racious packs of wild dogs.25 °
The acts of genocide were carried out not only by general slaughter,
but also by the targeting of specific individuals using previously prepared
lists broadcast over the government controlled Radio Television Libre des
Mille Collines.2 51 Such organization only reaffirmed and legitimated the
warnings received in January from Jean-Pierre. The UN estimated that by
the end of April some 200,000 Rwandans had been murdered using the
most inhumane of means:
The massacres were all the more horrific for the inhuman
way in which they were carried out, often with machetes,
axes, cudgels and iron bars. Women and young girls were
systematically raped, tortured and maimed, while males were
subjected to torture and extreme degradation before being
killed. Children who were not killed became helpless wit-
nesses to these atrocities." 2
Perhaps one of the most startling facts of the genocide is the inclu-
sion and involvement of men, women and children to carry out the
killings, both willingly and unwillingly.2 2 Indeed, the Hutus organizing
the massacre knew they would have to employ as many Hutu as possible
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Some women, including young girls in their teens, were
participants in the carnage, hacking other women and
children, and sometimes even men, to death. Some of these
women joined the killing willingly. Others were forced in
the same manner that men were forced, at the point of a
gun, by threats and other forms of intimidation.25
Even if they did not actually kill, many women and girls acted as
"cheerleaders" during a killing spree, and then went on to strip the
corpses of clothes and jewelry.2 6 "There is no evidence that women were
more willing to give refuge to the hunted than men.
257
Indeed, the role of women in the genocide spread across all classes
and levels of education. Educated women were involved in the organiza-
tion of the genocide, preparing lists and acting as informants. 28 Hospitals
no longer were places of refuge, with women nurses handing over both
Tutsis looking for shelter and their Tutsi colleagues. 259 Likewise, schools
and churches could not be trusted: female teachers and nuns were in-
volved in exposing those Tutsi seeking protection.
6
1
Children were also exposed to the killing. Both boys and girls would
follow their mother as she not only looted the bodies and homes of the
slaughtered, but while she brutally murdered.2 6 1 Many children were even
forced, and in some instances, chose to murder.26 2 The older male children
of women who were infamous killers were placed in active roles of es-
corts and killers.26 3 Conversely, the male Tutsi children were targets out of




To organize the genocide, the radio was immediately employed to
incite violence against the Tutsis. Broadcasts assured Hutu listeners that
plenty of targets remained: "Radio Mille Collines broadcast names, ad-
dresses, and even license-plate numbers. Killers often carried a machete in
one hand and a transistor radio in the other.'"2 65 Indeed, the radio was one
of the chief tools utilized in carrying out the genocide, broadcasters call-
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Dalliare saw firsthand the effects of the broadcasts, and as such he re-
quested assistance from the UN in blocking the radio transmissions.2 67
The U.S. was the country with the ability and technology to "neutralize"
the broadcasts, yet it refused its assistance, citing several reasons: the time
necessary to gain flight clearance from surrounding countries (one week);
a cost of $8,500 per flight hour; and a desire to uphold that trophy of
American freedoms-free speech.2 6 Power recounts what is perhaps the
most telling instance of U.S. bureaucratic ignorance: "When Bushnell
[Deputy Assistant Secretary of State] raised radio jamming yet again at a
meeting, one Pentagon official chided her for naivet6: 'Pru, radios don't
kill people. People kill people!' "269
The paralysis of the U.S., UN and other countries cannot be blamed
on lack of media attention. To the contrary, major U.S. newspapers began
reporting the horrific detaili within the first few days of the genocide.
2 70
On April 9, the Washington Post reported the killing of Rwandan workers
of international relief agencies. 27' The next day, both the Post and The
New York Times relayed stories of thousands of Rwandan corpses being
placed in piles.27 2 The stories of mass killings continued, and on April 19,
Human Rights Watch declared the estimated 100,000 now dead to be the
product of genocide. 73 On May 4, 1994, during an appearance on the
U.S. news program Nightline, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated, "Here you
have a real genocide, in Kigali.
' 274
Given the widely disseminated information on the genocide
occurring in Rwanda, especially the fact that it was coming from national,
reputable news sources, it is difficult if not impossible to understand why
it took so long for the UN and U.S. to respond.27 Nonetheless, by the
time the U.S. acceded to Dallaire's plan on May 17, the lives of the
genocide victims had already been lost. 276 The UN immediately requested
armored personnel carriers (APCs) from the U.S.2 77 However, further
bureaucratic squabbles ensued, and the APCs did not arrive until a month
267. Power, supra note 232, at 101.
268. Id.
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270. Id. at 94-96.
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later on June 19.278 Of course, by this time, the genocide was over and
roughly 800,000 were dead.
27 9
While those in the Clinton administration still generally claim that
President Clinton did not know of the genocide until two weeks into it,
there is evidence pointing to other personnel who knew almost immedi-
ately of the atrocities underway.280 Nevertheless, those defending the
President have conceded this much: "a belated intervention would have
saved 75,000 to 125,000-no small achievement.
281
The RPF had begun fighting the Hutu at the start of the geno-
cide.2 2 In fact, calling this a civil war rather than a genocide provided
bystanders with an excuse as to why they were not acting: "'War' was
'tragic,' but created no moral imperative."28 3 What remained of the RPF
marched into Kigali on July 4, 1994, and "took full control" of the capital,




UNAMIR II began its troop deployment in the middle of August
and became the chief method of stabilization in the devastated country,
providing both protection and humanitarian assistance.2" In July of 1994,
Rwanda's new President, Mr. Pasteur Bizimungu, secured the return of
refugees from Zaire. 287 The presence of UNAMIR II diverted most of
those Rwandans still intending to flee to Zaire, however, an estimated
100,000 still did so, most of whom were Hutu, some even genocidaires.
E. The Post-Genocide State
The aftermath of the Rwandan genocide leaves behind not only
surviving victims and witnesses, but also its perpetrators. Specifically, the
unspeakable trauma undergone by everyone has undoubtedly led to
widespread cases of both spirit injury and spirit murder, as the following
reports reveal. This section addresses those issues, as well as the legal sys-
tems now prosecuting acts of genocide and the post-genocide
government.
278. Id.
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281. Id. (referring to Alan Kuperman who claims in Foreign Affairs, that President Clin-
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Retrospect, FoR. ArE,Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 94.
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1 .Women
According to the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on
Human Rights assigned to monitor the human rights situation in
Rwanda, rape was used as a weapon of genocide and inflicted in some
250,000-500,000 cases: "[R]ape was the rule and its absence the excep-
tion. ' 288 Furthermore, women who "survived" were left to deal with
maiming and sexually transmitted diseases.2 9 Particularly devastating has
been the ongoing assault on the spirit of these women. Victims have been
deemed unsuitable for marriage, causing them to flee in hopes of finding
anonymity)29 Additionally, those who were impregnated during the rape
and subsequently bore the murderers' children find it nearly impossible to
accept these children, which has resulted in abortion and infanticide.
2 91
Besides rape and its consequences, women have been confronted
with new burdens of overwhelming responsibility to face on their own.
Because Tutsi men were often specific targets, especially the wealthy, edu-
cated and young, many of the Tutsi who survived are women.2 92 These
women have been "widowed, orphaned, [left] homeless, disabled and left
alone with the burden of looking after the remaining members of their
families. '" 293 The situation is further complicated by the availability of
"help" from the surrounding community: many of the women providing
aid participated in the killing and looting, and are now hiding behind the
guise of female innocence to avoid prosecution.294 "[T]he Rwandan kill-
ings took place in the local communities where both victim and aggressor
resided. The situation was truly one of neighbor killing neighbor. As a
result, many aggressors are known to the surviving family members."
29
2. Children
Likewise, children have suffered irreparable damage to their spirits.
United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has declared the degree of
traumatization undergone by these children as "unparalleled in any other
conflict in the last ten years. '296 Besides the many children murdered,
sometimes at the hands of their own parents in situations where one of
the parents was Tutsi, nearly ninety-six percent of surviving children were
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exposed to the brutal murder of family and friends.2 97 Even mothers and
grandmothers refused to hide their own Tutsi children and
grandchildren. 298 Perhaps even more horrifying was the extensive use of
children as instruments for committing crimes against humanity, either as
civilians or as soldiers.
2 99
Consequently, the Special Rapporteur has reported that surviving
children experience "depression, insomnia, nightmares, mistrust of those
around them and an ever-present fear of being killed."-'3 A year and a half
after the genocide, there were approximately 47,000 orphans in
Rwanda.311 Current reports cite grim statistics: "The massacres have left
several hundred thousand children either orphaned or separated from
their parents. A recent UNICEF report estimates that 700,000 children-
eighteen percent of Rwanda's 4.2 million children--still live in difficult
circumstances. "22
3. Bringing Perpetrators to Justice
In order to prosecute those involved in carrying out the massacre,
the Security Council voted to establish the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for Rwanda (ICTR) on November 8, 1994. 303 In general, the ICTR
has focused its attention on the gravest of offenders, but is bound by the
UN's prohibition on imposing a death sentence.0 4 However, obtaining
justice has been a tedious process. Only eight people have been found
guilty since 1994, and the first "not guilty" verdict came down in July of
2001 .30
The Akayesu' case is one of the most significant decisions handed
down by the ICTR. Defendant Akayesu was a Rwandan national who
had been mayor of the Taba commune until 1994. 3°7 He was indicted on
some fifteen different charges, including "genocide, complicity in geno-
297. Children of Rwanda's Genocide, N.Y TIMEs, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/
world/Africa/index-rwanda-children.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2001).
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304. Drumbl, supra note 33, at 1316 n.467.
305. See Belgium arrests genocide suspect, BBC NEws, July 27, 2001, at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/hi/English/world/Africa/newsid_1 460000/1460344.stm.
306. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T (Sept. 2, 1998), at http://
www.ictr.org/English/judgements/akayesu.html.
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International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the World Court, and the
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cide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, extermination,
murder, torture, cruel treatment, rape, other inhumane acts and outrages
upon personal dignity, crimes against humanity and violations of Article 3
Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions .... " The complaint was
then amended to include an additional three counts of acts of sexual vio-
lence defined as "forcible sexual penetration of the vagina, anus, or oral
cavity by a penis and/or the vagina or anus by some other object, and
sexual abuse, such as forced nudity.
' 3
09
The court held that rape and sexual violence fit within the meaning
of genocide delineated in the Genocide Convention. 3 ' The prosecution
proved this by showing that "rape and sexual violence were committed
with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular
group-in this case the Tutsi women .... " Judge Pillay of South Africa
concluded with this declaration: "From time immemorial, rape has been
regarded as spoils of war ... now it will be considered a war crime. We
want to send out a strong signal that rape is no longer a trophy of war."
31 2
Although the ICTR handles most serious cases, Rwandan courts are
also involved. 31 3 Rwanda is holding its own national trials, so as to create a
form of concurrent jurisdictions, though the statute grants the ICTR su-
perseding jurisdiction.3"4 Rwanda has not abolished the death penalty, and
therefore, courts can sentence those guilty of the gravest offenses to
death.31 5 However, the wheels of justice have moved slowly, with the ac-
cused being detained for several years before trial, thereby raising human
rights concerns. 36 According to a report by Amnesty International in




The national courts have followed the Organic Law enacted to deal
with the genocide trials, which consists of four levels of offenses.31 Cate-
gory one applies to leaders, organizers and planners; category two covers
charges of manslaughter to murder; category three applies to assault; and
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category four covers theft."9 However, as mentioned above, the sheer
magnitude of the process has posed numerous problems.
32
1
In an effort to deal with these problems, Rwanda is implementing
the Gacaca 21 legal system, a system "set up at four administrative levels
nationwide, the lowest level being the cell, followed by the sector, district
and province. These courts ... have the power to hear and pass judgment
on all but the highest category of genocide. The respective levels ... will
judge different categories of genocide suspects. ' 322 The chief objectives of
the system are twofold: first, it is hoped the increase in capacity to con-
duct trials will rapidly diminish the current backlog of some 115,000
genocide suspects; and second, it is believed that the participatory nature
of the system "[f]oster[s] national reconciliation between killers and the
families of victims.
323
The core of the Gacaca legal system centers on its grassroots nature:
it is "a traditional system of justice involving the local population in try-
ing people accused of participation in the genocide." '324 According to
Justice Minister Jean de Dieu Mucyo, "Gacaca is a participatory system of
justice, not just a people's court, because it is based on the participation of
those who saw what happened in 1994 ".... 32' The benefits of such a
system may include increased efficiency and facilitating an environment
where witnesses of genocide crimes would be more likely to come for-
ward.326 However, human rights organizations like Amnesty International
have voiced a number of concerns:
The accused in the [G]acaca trials will not be allowed repre-
sentation by a defence lawyer; [t]hose judging these
extremely complex and serious cases will have no legal
training or may have a personal interest in the verdict, thus
potentially undermining the competence, independence and
impartiality of these courts; [and] fundamental aspects of the
[G]acaca proposals do not conform to basic international
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322. RWANDA Gov'T, GACACA JuDrES TO BE ELECTED IN OCTOBER, , at' http://
www.Rwanda.com/government/07-1 l_01_gacaca.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2001).
323. Rwanda Speeds Up Genocide Trials, supra note 321.
324. AMNEsTY INT'L,supra note 317.
325. Rwanda Gets New Judicial System, NEws24.com, at http://www.news24.co.za/
News24/Africa/CentralAfrica/0,1113,2-11-39-1088593,00.html (last visited Oct. 31,
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standards for fair trials guaranteed in international treaties
which Rwanda has ratified.
3 27
Rwandans elected 260,000 Gacaca Court judges on October 4,
2001.32 The election process was carried out as follows: "The Electoral
Commission ... send[s] representatives to each cell in the country ... to
supervise the elections. The cell is the lowest administrative level in
Rwanda, with nearly 10,000 cells nationwide.
'329
Finally, each cell elects nineteen judges.30 The courts are then
granted the authority to rule on all but the highest category of genocide
crimes. 331 Procedurally, the system is participatory, calling upon the mem-
bers of the community to serve as judges and witnesses.3 2
It remains to be seen if a combination of prosecutions by the Tribu-
nal, national courts, and now Gacaca tribunals will speed up the process of
obtaining some small measure of justice. In a country where so much re-
mains broken, even incremental improvements in provision of services
may be revolutionary in scope for both victims and victimizers.
4.The Post-Genocide Government and Continuing Conflict
After the RPF came to power in July of 1994, it formed a new gov-
ernment called The Broad Based Government of National Unity.333 The
fundamental law established by the new regime consisted of three com-
ponents: the Constitution, the Arusha Accords334, and political declarations
of the parties.335 Additionally the former government's party, the MRND,
was banned, as was all political organizing through 1999.336 Finally, in 1999
the post-genocide government unilaterally extended its rule through
2003.
337
The post-genocide period has been plagued with political instability.
Most recently, in early 2000 the President, Speaker of the National
327. Id.
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Assembly and the Prime Minister all resigned due to pressure.38 Of the
three, the latter two officials fled the country.339 Interestingly, Joseph
Kabuye Sebarenzi, the Tutsi speaker of the National Assembly, "was the
first leading Tutsi politician to flee. His departure highlighted the rift
between Tutsi survivors of the 1994 genocide and the RPF over such
issues as jobs in the administration, military promotions, aid to genocide
victims, and justice for genocide." 3"
As a result, the former Vice President General Paul Kagame was
elected President by the assembly.341 This was a significant departure from
existing practice and law because Kagame, a Tutsi minority, replaced a
Hutu, thus effectively abolished the system of reserving the Head of State
office for the group constituting the majority.3 42 Furthermore, after cabi-
net positions were reconfigured, the new President's RPF party ended up
with ten of the eighteen seats.343 The result of these changes was a viola-
tion of the Arusha Accords.3"
The above events suggest that the post-genocide government is not
promoting adherence to the rule of law to the fullest extent possible. First,
the current regime has banned public meetings, which greatly inhibits the
ability of political parties to present their platform. 3 s Furthermore, as
mentioned above, both Hutu and Tutsi officials have been fleeing the
country.34 Tutsi students have also been critical of the government, fleeing
to Uganda due to "the 'dictatorial' nature of the government.
347
In concluding the history of the post-genocidal era, it is of no small
concern that violence has continued in the region during the last half of
the decade.34 After the RPF came to power in 1994, some two million
Rwandans were led into Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC)) by the overthrown government. 349 However, as the Hutus
were fleeing, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis were returning to
Rwanda.3 0 Of this phenomenon, Gourevitch observed:
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What possessed these people, a great many of whom had
never before set foot in Rwanda, to abandon relatively es-
tablished and secure lives in order to settle in a graveyard?
The legacy of exclusion, the pressures of exile, and the
memory of, or longing for, a homeland all played a part. So
did a widespread determination to defy the genocide, to
stand and be counted in a place where one was meant to
have been wiped out. And for many, the sense of belonging
was mingled with a straightforward profit motive.
3 51
Since then, the period has been marked with violence as the RPF
has tried to "put down an insurgency which had operated out of north-
western Rwanda and adjacent areas of the ... DRC.'3 2 The result of this
has been the loss of "tens of thousands" of lives.3s3 The refugees in the
DRC are mostly Hutu driven out after the Tutsi-led RPF came to power.
Therefore these exiles constitute a continuous and imminent threat to the
current state of Rwanda. 3- 4 The threat and possibility of another genocide
is by no means an irrational or distant fear of the Tutsis now living in
Rwanda.
The next section addresses how various democratic principles oper-
ate within Africa, focusing specifically on some of the problems that
democracy encounters within African states. Professor Cass Sunstein pro-
vides various principles that are relevant to a country making the
transition to a democracy, especially with regard to constitution making.
However, scholars with a distinct African perspective point to the hin-
drances present in African countries that often prevent democracy from
coming to fruition.
III. DEMOCRACY WITHIN AFRICA:THE CHALLENGE OF IMPLEMENTING
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES WITHIN AFRICAN STATES
This section presents a discussion of democracy and democratic
principles at work in Africa. First, it examines the various democratic
principles that Cass Sunstein has identified as crucial to "designing" a
democracy 55 While guiding principles are necessary, they must also be
grounded in the concrete reality of African experience. Thus, the remain-
der of this section will survey past experiences of democracy at work in
Africa coupled with suggestions and considerations from African or "in-
siders'" perspectives.
351. GouREvrrCH, supra note 23, at 230-31.
352. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 337.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18.
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A. Principles and Considerations Germane
to the Creation of a Democracy
While a number of western scholars have expounded on the nature
of democracy, this section focuses on the work of University of Chicago
Professor Cass Sunstein in Designing Democracy: /hat Constitutions Do.356
Professor Sunstein lays out several considerations critical to the constitu-
tional drafting process that can have applicability in the Rwandan
context. Because the operation of pure democracy in the Rwandan con-
text would only place the genocide perpetrators back into power (the
Hutu comprise eighty-five percent of the population)," 7 Sunstein's para-
digm of deliberative democracy and its accompanying considerations are
highly relevant to Rwanda as it constructs its constitution.
Sunstein begins with the overarching view that "a constitution
should promote deliberative democracy, an idea that is meant to combine
political accountability with a high degree of reflectiveness and a general
commitment to reason giving.' 38 Consequently, a deliberative democracy
is not a direct democracy whereby "popular referenda" controls, but in-
stead it provides the necessary structures needed to facilitate exposure to
and discussion of diverse points of view.3 9 The aims of this process are
specifically germane to Rwanda in its early discussions of democracy and
constitutionalism.
However, Sunstein also acknowledges that deliberation alone cannot
explain or solve all conflict or disagreements.36 ° Indeed, Sunstein calls our
attention to "group polarization," a concept he uses to describe "a proc-
ess by which groups of like-minded people move one another to
increasingly extreme positions."36'
Related to group polarization is the idea of deliberating enclaves,
which are nothing more than groups of like-minded people.362 While
these groups do provide for minority opinions, there is also inherent peril
in these groups: "Members will move to positions that lack merit but are
predictable consequences of the particular circumstances of enclave delib-
eration."363 Sunstein resolves this somewhat paradoxical arrangement with
the following prescription: "An appreciation of group polarization helps
show why a constitutional democracy takes steps to protect deliberation
within enclaves, to ensure that those inside enclaves hear alternative views,
and to ensure as well that those outside of particular enclaves are exposed
356. Id.
357. See BuREAu OF AFRIcAN AFFAIRs, supra note 24.
358. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 6-7.
359. Id. at 7.
360. Id. at 8.
361. Id.
362. Id. at 45.
363. Id. at 46.
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to what enclave members have to say. ' 3 64 Thus, Rwanda would be the
wiser for heeding Sunstein's balancing approach.
Sunstein also advocates the idea of "incomplete theorization,"
which encourages agreement on constitutional practices rather than on
the underlying theories.3 65 He argues that it is easier for people to agree
on practices or rights than on the theories underlying them.6 6 As an ex-
ample, he cites provisions from the South African constitution to
demonstrate what an incompletely theorized agreement looks like (e.g.
"freedom of speech" or "religious liberty").3 67 Leaving these concepts in a
more abstract realm ultimately leaves room for them to take shape as soci-
ety changes and progresses.
36
1
Sunstein also makes the distinction between constitutions that are
preservative and those that are transformative, the former safeguarding
tradition and the latter calling the state "toward an ideal future. '369 Indeed,
the implications in the Rwandan context are obvious: while much can be
learned from the past, the events of the last decade reveal that there is
much to discard and much to achieve in the future.
Sunstein goes on to introduce us to what he posits as the "anticaste
principle," which "forbids social and legal practices from translating
highly visible and morally irrelevant differences into a systemic source of
social disadvantage, unless there is a very good reason for a society to do
so. ' '37 ° This idea goes much further than current U.S. constitutional pro-
tection, resembling that of countries like South Africa and Canada instead.
The latter countries examine and occasionally strike down laws produc-
ing discriminatory effects, whereas the U.S. requires that the law either
discriminate on its face or have been fashioned with a discriminatory
purpose in order to strike it down.
3 71
To combat the effects of a caste system, Sunstein argues that remedial
programs, founded upon their objection to caste, are entirely appropriate
insofar as they are abolishing the second-class status once established.
372
Thus, Rwanda stands to learn much from taking into consideration the
anticaste principle and doing all it can to erase any categories of second-
class citizenship-a process that will require affirmative action programs
in areas like education, government, employment and political arenas.
373
364. Id. at 47.
365. Id. at 50.
366. Id.
367. Id. at 56.
368. Id. at 60.
369. Id. at 68.
370. Id. at 155 (emphasis removed).
371. Id. at 166.
372. Id. at 180.
373. See infra Part IV
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Finally, Sunstein addresses whether socioeconomic rights should be
placed in a constitution-rights often referred to as positive rights be-
cause they require the government to provide something.3 74 The core
principle advocated here is extremely relevant to post-genocidal Rwanda:
"Should constitutions protect social and economic rights? It is certainly




In the South African context, where the constitution does include
positive rights like the right to housing, the Constitutional Court has in-
terpreted this not to mean "housing on demand but a reasonable program
for ensuring access to housing for poor people, including some kind of
program for ensuring emergency relief." '376 Likewise, Rwanda's inclusion
of socioeconomic rights is essential if it is going to ensure a democracy
where its citizens can experience a level of independence and security.
B. Democracy in Africa: Examples from the
Past andAdvice for the Future
While Sunstein's considerations are of great relevance, reviewing
constitutional theories designed with the African context in mind is criti-
cally important to the creation of a Rwandan democracy. A chief
problem in implementing democracy in Rwanda is the fear that the
eighty-five percent Hutu majority will crush the fourteen percent Tutsi
minority. Professor Muna Ndulo has summarized the ethnicity problem
within African democracies as follows:
[TIhe issue of ethnicity could potentially be destabilizing to
the democratic process. Democracy can magnify rather than
reduce the adverse effects of ethnicity. African states also
need to accommodate the significant numbers of racial mi-
norities that exist in their countries. Constitutions must deal
with this fact sensitively by not only acknowledging the
fears and apprehensions of the racial minority groups, but
also by meeting their legitimate demands and meaningfully
engaging them in political systems and nation-building. The
issue of ethnic or racial minority protection has to be ad-
dressed in a proactive manner.377
374. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 222.
375. Id. at 235.
376. Id. at 236.
377. Muna Ndulo, The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for Institution Building, 16
NAT'L BLACK L.J. 70,81 (1998-1999).
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As Mamdani puts it, "foreclos[ing] the possibility of a democratic des-
potism remains our toughest challenge yet.""37 However, control of all
power by the minority does nothing to mitigate the tensions between
Hutu and Tutsi,37' and only conjures up abuses perpetrated upon the Hutu
by Tutsi under colonialism.
Mamdani's prescription for Rwanda comes from the experience of
another African country-Zanzibar.38 In that situation, both the "Arab"
minority and "African" majority yielded power as Zanzibar merged with
Tanganyika to become Tanzania.38" ' Over time, this fusion worked a grad-
ual dissolution of these separate identities, and the new "Zanzibar"
identity slowly became the unifi'ing identity.38 2 Mamdani posits that the
opposing political identities of Hutu and Tutsi must be abolished, and, in
their place, Tutsis and Hutus together could begin to identify under the
regional Banyarwanda identity.
383
In evaluating Tanzania's success with implementing democracy,
scholars have also found other factors highly relevant.384 First, there was a
great grassroots effort in Tanzania to involve the public in the decision-
making process. 35 Second, in Tanzania, both sides were willing to cede
power, and control was curbed by such provisions as a two-term limita-
tion upon the office of the President.
3 6
Concerning the implementation of democracy in African states in
general, Ndulo cites a number of considerations relevant to these often
ethnically-divided countries. 387 First, the foundational consideration is the
constitution: "The basic law that implements constitutional democracy is
the national constitution. It represents the basic structure of an organized
society. ' 38 Furthermore, for democracy to survive in Africa, states must
develop "constitutional arrangements that set up viable institutions which
foster an environment where peace and development can flourish.""3 9
Ndulo warns that failure is likely within African countries if
"Africa's cultural and historical peculiarities" are ignored." ° Thus for a
constitution to obtain legitimacy within a population, the country's






384. See ZrYAD MOTALA, CONSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR A DEMOcRATIc SOUTH AFRICA
151-52 (1994).
385. Id. at 151. For further discussion on legitimacy, see infra Part IVD.
386. See MoTALA, supra note 384, at 152.
387. Ndulo, supra note 377, at 79.
388. See id. at 80.
389. Id. at 75.
390. Id. at 81.
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unique history must be taken into account. Merely borrowing provisions
from other constitutions without considering the country's past sets up a
state for failed democracy.391 Professor Makau wa Mutua also warns
against relying too heavily on rights discourse alone: "What is doubtful,
however, is ... the possibility for any state, to overcome such a dreadful
legacy of human rights abuses primarily through the rights idiom. "392
Other problems include the roles of a free press and military re-
gimes. While establishment of "a free and vibrant press" is absolutely
necessary, it is often problematic in African countries: media outlets are
frequently owned by governments or receive substantial subsidies from
them.393 Additionally, the intrusive role of the military in many African
countries must be curbed: "It is ... essential that the military be respectful
of the democratic process. In some parts of Africa, especially West Africa,
the military has proved to be the greatest threat to the development of
democratic governance.
' 394
Coupled with this problem and exacerbating it is the inclination for
African states to maintain highly centralized governments, which is a
structure that remains from colonial rule.391 "Centralization of power re-
fers to the constitutional concentration of power in the hands of a few
executive offices and this greatly undermines the importance of courts,
legislatures and sub-regional governments. '396 Ndulo's solution is to invest
local governments with "real responsibilities" and actual power.
397
Ndulo also draws our attention to the electoral process.3 9 Simply
put, winner-take-all systems do not work in most African countries de-
spite the fact that such a system is used in nearly all African states. 399 This
process:
creates permanent losers and permanent winners.... The
size of a party's representation is thus determined not only
by the number of votes received, but also by their geo-
graphic concentration.... [G]roups that are numerically
small can never win an election. They, therefore, remain
391. See id. (citing Adrien K Wing, Towards Democracy in South Africa: A Review of Ziyad
Motala, Constitutional Options for a Democratic South Africa: A Comparative Perspective, 16
MICH.J. INT'L L. 689 (1995)). For a discussion of achieving legitimacy within Rwanda, see
infira Part IV E.
392. Mutua, supra note 20, at 111.
393. Ndulo, supra note 377, at 82-83.
394. Id. at 83.
395. Id. at 84.
396. Id. at 84.
397. Id. Note that this delegation of power must involve more than mere administra-
tive efficiency between the central and localized governments, as this was true of Rwanda
at the time of the genocide.
398. Id. at 88.
399. Id. at 90.
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permanently aggrieved. Such a system will be unable to im-
plement democratic principles in deeply divided societies
that are non-homogenous.4"
Finally, speaking of South Africa's experience, Mutua warns that a
democratic, rule of law, rights-based state ... [can] turn[] out
to be an instrument for the preservation of the privileges
and the ill-gotten gains of the [W]hite minority. The state
has become a stamp of approval for an unjust and unfair so-
ciety. It is clear that a state that is unable, in the first place, to
overcome these basic problems cannot become a human
rights institution.
40 1
Therefore, our analysis must invoke more than the proper language,
being mindful of the history and context of both Rwanda and Africa.
In conclusion, both Western and African scholars' explications on
democracy furnish this project with appropriate guideposts and caution-
ary advice. Thus, Part IV offers recommendations for a new Rwandan
constitution in light of the past Rwandan and African experiences re-
counted in Part II. Specifically, these proposals address discrimination
directed toward ethnic and racial minorities, women, children and other
disadvantaged groups; freedom of speech, press and information; and how
to achieve legitimacy and penetration within Rwanda.
IV PRESENT CONSTITUTIONAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE CREATION OF A
HuMAN RIGHTS STATE AND THE CONSEQUENT
HEALING OF SPIRIT INJURIES
A. Introduction--The Nature of Spirit Injuries
The various accounts and reports of the Rwandan genocide all con-
tain a common thread: each narrative reveals one or more symptoms of
spirit injury, which this Article will now examine. Symptoms include de-
filement, silence, denial, shame, guilt, fear, blaming the victim, violence,
self-destructive behaviors, acute despair/emotional death, emasculation,
trespass, and pollution, a number of which have manifested themselves in
Rwanda.
40 2
The first symptom present in Rwanda is defilement: "[Because a]
fundamental part of ourselves and of our dignity is dependent upon the
uncontrollable, powerful, external observers who constitute society,... [i]f
400. Id. at 90.
401. Mutua, supra note 20, at 112.
402. See generally Wing & Merchin, supra note 15, at 29-38 (discussing the symptoms of
spirit injury in the context of rape).
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society places a low value on certain of its members, they in turn will
perceive themselves as having a lesser worth in that society. "403 The result
of defilement includes the collapse of family structure.'40 Rwanda is an
example of defilement taken to the extreme. Society (eighty-five percent
being Hutu) placed such a low value on the Tutsi minority that Hutu
took the Tutsis' very lives. Conversely, the Hutu also live with a history of
defilement: under colonialism, the Tutsi became the oppressor of the
Hutu, subjecting the latter to involuntary servitude and beatings at the
direction of the colonialists. 4°5 Thus, both Hutu and Tutsi live with feel-
ings of defilement stemming from devaluation.
The silence of both Hutu and Tutsi is the second symptom of spirit
injury, and is indicative of "a chronic, festering wound which needs treat-
ment." It is not difficult to understand Hutu silence, as they were the
perpetrators and do not want to incriminate themselves. Closely related
to this is a third symptom-denial, which Hutus regularly manifest. Ac-
cording to Gourevitch, after learning of a Hutu admitting participation in
the genocide, he was surprised: "In my time in Rwanda, I had never en-
countered anyone who admitted to having taken part in the genocide." 7
Besides the Hutu, the post-genocide Tutsi population has also been
silent. For example, women who were raped remain silent for fear that
they will be rejected by their families and communities." Likewise, those
Tutsi women who bore children resulting from rape by Hutu men are
forced to remain silent out of shame and fear of rejection." Thus, shame,
constituting a fourth symptom of spirit injury, is closely related to silence.
Undoubtedly, shame, as well as guilt (a fifth symptom), are also factors in
Hutu silence.
A sixth symptom of spirit injury is fear. For the Tutsi, this most obvi-
ously translates to fear that the genocide could happen again if the Hutu
were to regain control of Rwanda. As a result, the RPF led government
has aggressively held on to its power and been quick to crush any Hutu
opposition, whether inside the country or from incursions from the
DRC.4 1 Conversely, as Mamdani has pointed out, the Hutu also are
plagued with symptoms of fear: mindful of their oppression under coloni-
alism at the hands of Tutsis, Hutus fear a loss of their middle class status
and a return to involuntary servitude."
403. Id. at 29 (quoting Wilams, supra note 10, at 151).
404. Id. at 29-30.
405. GoUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 57.
406. Wing & Merchin, supra note 15, at 31.
407. GouRtvITCH, supra note 23, at 305.
408. See discussion supra Part IL.E.1.
409. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
410. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
411. See discussion supra Part II.E.4.
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The seventh symptom--severe depression and despair of the geno-
cide survivor-remains one of the cruelest symptoms of spirit injury,
resulting in near emotional death. Gourevitch relates the following obser-
vation:
Bonaventure [a survivor] believed that survival was mean-
ingless until one found "a reason to survive again, a reason
to look to tomorrow." This was a widely held view in
Rwanda, where depression was epidemic. The so-called
survival instinct is often described as an animal urge to pre-
serve oneself. But once the threat of bodily annihilation is
relieved, the soul still requires preservation, and a wounded
soul becomes the source of its own affliction; it cannot nurse
itself directly. So survival can seem a curse, for one of the
dominant needs of the needy soul is to be needed. As I
came to know survivors, I found that, when it comes to soul
preservation, the urge to look after others is often greater
than the urge to look after oneself.
412
Thus, even to survive the genocide was not to be blessed, but rather
cursed.
The symptom of emasculation is the eighth symptom present in
Rwanda, and involves the male Tutsi feeling that he failed to protect both
his family and the Tutsi population as a whole. Emasculation was caused
not only from the physical violence, but also from the sexual violence:
Tutsi men suffer from feelings that they could not protect their Tutsi
women from Hutu men. The effects of emasculation can be devastating
on the culture as a whole, constituting a spirit injury on the entire com-
munity: "The men no longer perform those roles they traditionally
performed in the society, and the women are forced out of necessity to
take over some of those roles. This sudden shift in the societal roles can
lead to a fragmentation within the society... [I]t might rip the social fab-
ric of that society forever." '413 Violence, a ninth symptom of spirit injury,
can also be an effect of emasculation, and domestic violence is currently a
problem within Rwanda that is being handled inadequately.4 4
Trespass constitutes a tenth symptom of spirit injury in Rwanda.
The genocide carried out by the Hutu can be viewed by the Tutsi as a
trespass on Tutsi property, from their physical property to more intangible
items."' After the Hutu revolution in 1959, thousands ofTutsi fled, leaving
behind land, homes and personal property."6 Furthermore, trespass was
412. GOUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 228.
413. SeeWing & Merchin, supra note 15, at 34.
414. See infra Part IVB.2.
415. See infa Part IVB.2.
416. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 71, at 8.
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most obvious during the genocide, when Hutu forced their way into Tutsi
homes, killing the inhabitants, seizing property and even looting the
dead." ' Additionally, because of the gender inequality present in Rwanda,
Tutsi men undoubtedly felt that Hutu men had trespassed on their "fe-
male property" when the Hutu committed crimes of rape.
4 1
1
The results of trespass are no less devastating than other symptoms of
spirit injury.
This spirit injury may cause the ... men to reject their tar-
nished "property." They may not want to marry or continue
to stay married to such damaged "property." Furthermore
... many of these men regard the resulting children as tar-
nished "property" as well, and will not accept them as their
own. The women, having been rejected by the men of their
own ethnic group as tarnished or damaged, will feel ostra-
cized from the entire society.4"9
As discussed previously, these symptoms have already manifested
themselves. Women raped by Hutu men are no longer considered for
marriage.42 ° Furthermore, women have fled their communities in
anonymity with their Tutsi-Hutu children who were the product of a
genocide rape.42 '
Though not a complete list, the final and eleventh symptom we will
discuss is pollution, a situation where "individuals ... might view the
cross-cultural rape as a deliberate attempt at ethnic 'pollution.' "42 Conse-
quently, children born from such a rape
may be seen as "polluted" and undesirable, and thus will
find it difficult to be accepted in the society.... Additionally,
the mere existence of these children will serve as a constant
reminder to the ... women of the shame, humiliation, and
injury inflicted upon them by the rape, and their utter help-
lessness to prevent or stop the rape. These children will also
serve as a reminder to the ... men that they were unable to
prevent this humiliation to their wives, mothers, and daugh-
ters. Furthermore, these children will serve as a constant
reminder to all ... of their inability to prevent these atroci-
ties. The result will be a long-lasting spirit injury.
41
417. AFRiCAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 81-83.
418. See Wing & Merchin, supra note 15, at 34-35.
419. Id. at 36.
420. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
421. See discussion supra Part II.E.1.
422. Wing & Merchin, supra note 15, at 36.
423. Id. at 37-38.
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Men are rejecting these children born from Hutu rape of their Tutsi
women during the genocide, and women are in turn forced to flee their
communities with their children. '24 Furthermore, time can only tell how
these children will be treated and what kinds of self-destructive behav-
iors425 they may engage in because of neglect and rejection.
Consequently, the history of Rwanda is in no way deficient in pre-
senting those issues that a constitution must address if it is to be successful
in creating a human rights state capable of facilitating the healing of spirit
injuries. The symptoms of spirit injury are acute and severe, and a consti-
tution centered on human rights can hope to be just one cure in a
panoply of remedies that includes justice through trials, reconciliation
through forgiveness, and restoration of land and property.
Healing ethnic divisions, deconstructing racialization, protecting mi-
norities, limiting government power resident in such practices as declaring
a "state of emergency, ' 426 ensuring the freedom of speech, press and ex-
pression, and achieving legitimacy and ultimately penetration of the new
constitution are among the subjects whose inclusion is nothing less than
imperative if the violence and ensuing spirit injuries within Rwanda and
along its borders is to cease. The following sections address each of these
issues in turn.
B. Rights of Minorities, Women, Children, and Disadvantaged
After recounting the history of Rwanda and examining how the
hostility between the Tutsis and Hutus almost resulted in the annihilation
of the former, it is no surprise that a new constitution must direct its at-
tention to destroying this divide. Additionally, since Rwanda's population
experiences discrimination in a variety of other areas, an equality clause
must prohibit discrimination based on race, ethnicity, sex, gender, disabil-
ity, age, sexual orientation, or membership in some other minority group.
Although we recognize each minority group as separate, it is
important that the multiplicative nature of the problem is recognized.
427
As a starting point, every human being has multiple identities. 2 ' For some,
424. DEP'T OF PUB. INo., supra note 71, at 6-7.
425. Self-destructive behavior is also a symptom of spirit injury, and includes such con-
duct as smoking, alcohol and drug abuse, food abuse, and engaging in high-risk sexual
activities.
426. Because the scope and emphasis of this article is on a prescription for the new
constitution with regard to human rights norms, discussions concerning the structure of
government will be limited to the intersection of human rights and unchecked govern-
mental power.
427. See Adrien K. Wing, Introduction: Global Critical Race Feminism for the Twenty-First




Michigan journal of Race & Law
such as Anglo-Saxon American males, these identities may secure
positions of privilege.429 On the other hand, when an identity stems from
membership in a minority group or a group traditionally disadvantaged,
the oppression can be devastating.430 The problem is further exacerbated
and compounded when an individual is simultaneously a member of
many minority groups, and consequently, experiences discrimination from
identification with each of the groups at the same time.
The juncture at which all these identities intersect is not to be ig-
nored, given its ability to both privilege and disadvantage the possessor.431
The implications in the Rwandan context are profound. For example, a
disabled, Tutsi woman would be subjected to discrimination based on her
disability, her ethnicity (or perceived race) and sex. As discussed in the
introduction, this discrimination causes spirit injuries, whose cumulative
result may be spirit murder.
3
1
While the current Rwandan constitution provides that "[a]ll citizens
shall be equal in the eyes of the law, without any discrimination, especially
in respect to race, color, origin, ethnic background, clan, sex, opinion, re-
ligion, or social status," 433 enforcement of these provisions remains
unrealized in a broken society. Thus, the following subsections address
discrimination with regard to ethnicity/racialization, women, children,
and other disadvantaged groups such as the disabled, elderly, indigenous,
and the opposition.
1. A Call to Ethnic (Re)integration:
Dismantling Racialization in Rwanda
The ethnic strife within Rwanda is a condition common to many
African countries.131 Unfortunately, this has prevented the building of na-
tionhood and a national identity.435 The fragmentation of ethnicity, or a
sense of "Rwandanness," is the earliest and remaining cause for the ha-
tred between the Tutsi and Hutu people. Without the establishment of
national unity, the cycles of reoccurring violence will continue. Therefore,
the constitution must call for and facilitate the ethnic cooperation of the
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According to Rutembesa, if we define ethnicity as a shared ancestor,
language and culture, the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa would compose a single
ethnicity. 37 However, as discussed earlier, the Hutu and Tutsi were socially
constructed as distinct groups: the Tutsi and Hutu lived under a functional
monarchy where the aristocratic Tutsi ruled over the more agricultural
Hutus despite the fact that the Hutus composed eighty-five percent of the
population and the Tutsi only fourteen percent.13' Thus, the discussion
must never look solely to numbers as a means to determining who should
be protected or in power.
Interestingly, this pre-colonial political order did not lead to violence
until colonization under the Germans and Belgians. 39 Their influence
exacerbated the ethnic differences through a process of racialization to the
point where the dividing line between the groups and its accompanying
hatred was solidified with the characterization of Tutsis as an alien race
and Hutus as indigenous."0 Additionally, Rutembesa summarizes Rwan-
dan history as follows: "[T]he historical development of Rwanda was
defined by ethnicity, and that ethnicity served as a pretextual basis for
building a monolithic consolidation of power that abolished diversity as
opposition. "441
Although much has been done to sever the ties that once existed be-
tween Hutus and Tutsis, those within Rwanda are not without hope or a
plan for achieving their end-a unification of all Hutu, Tutsi and Twa
peoples as Rwandans. Indeed, the very "educational" and propaganda-
laden process that served to construct much of the divide between the
Hutus and Tutsis can also be subverted to tear down those walls, namely
through education of the public. While not denying that differences do
exist between the groups-certainly a degree of separateness existed be-
tween Hutu and Tutsi prior to colonization-the focus must change from
ethnicity and race to Rwandanness and the creation of a national iden-
tity.
442
Professor Mark Drumbl sees this as a critical shift:
In order for dualist and pluralist postgenocidal societies to
coexist in peace, a critical mass of individuals eventually
must change the principal instrumentalization of their po-
litical allegiance away from the ethnic (or racial or religious)
437. See Part L:The Rwandan Context, supra note 9, at 28.
438. BuaRAu or ARlc A AFFAIRS, supra note 24.
439. Part I: The Rwandan Context, supra note 9, at 29.
440. MAMDANI, supra note 16, at 102.
441. Part L The Rwandan Context, supra note 9, at 29.
442. See Drumbl, supra note 33, at 1242-45, 1292-94.
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group. In the case of Rwanda, this suggests that individuals
must identify themselves politically as Rwandan citizens.
4 3
Furthermore, while it is perfectly acceptable for a Rwandan to iden-
tify as a Tutsi and as Rwandan, it is imperative that one's Rwandanness
"trump ethnic allegiances, at least in the areas where persons act politi-
cally as opposed to simply socially.
44
The process of establishing Rwandanness is not necessarily an easy
task, a fact that exposes an often-neglected injury to the collective Rwan-
dan spirit. "The ultimate tragedy of Rwanda may be the emptiness of the
concept of 'Rwandan' to many of its citizens. Hutu and Tutsi may have
lost the ability to imagine each other, and themselves, as Rwandan.
'" 44 1
Despite the close communal world the Hutu and Tutsi inhabit, they have
constructed a degree of separateness that precludes any commonalities in
the political arena or in citizenship.4 6 Thus, a massive deconstruction of
these hollow constructs must occur, and in their place, a "common
framework for living" must be established."7
Lest the "educated" observer hastily and pessimistically write off
such a possibility, there have been reports of the notion of "Rwandan-
ness" penetrating the populace in the most heroic of circumstances:
During their attack on the school [on April 30, 1997] ... the
students, teenage girls who had been roused from their sleep,
were ordered to separate themselves-Hutus from Tutsis.
But the students had refused. At both schools, the girls said
they were simply Rwandans, so they were beaten and shot
indiscriminately.
8
Furthermore, in an attempt to curb the government's unhealthy fo-
cus on ethnicity, it no longer permits identity cards to state the holder's
ethnic origin.
4 9
The task that lies before Rwanda is clear: "A reintegration of the
ethnic groups of the country must occur, to establish a unified national
identity. One of the means of achieving convergence of power, the state
must submit all citizens to the same rights and the same access to public
443. Id. at 1294.
444. Id. at 1294-95.
445. Id. at 1295.
446. Id. at 1294.
447. Id.
448. GOUREVITCH, supra note 23, at 353. The perpetrators were a group of 150 farmer
interahamwe engaged in a Hutu power campaign. Id.
449. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS FOR 1999: RWANDA,
at 12, available at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/1999_hrp-report/
rwanda.html (last visited Aug. 13,2001).
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employment.""4 ' This requires a constitution that explicitly recognizes the
common elements of ethnicity among Rwandans and calls upon all citi-
zens to share in a spirit of national unity under the banner of
Rwandanness that trumps all other differences. Indeed, fostering such
unity is imperative if Rwanda is to overcome one of the chief obstacles to
attaining penetration of the rule of law-the "rise of ethnic national-
ism . ,451
However, as suggested above, and as the experience of neighboring
Burundi indicates, language recognizing the existence of both objective
and subjective differences may also be required:
Article Two of the Arusha Accord of the Burundi negotia-
tions recognized ethnic imbalance. For example, the
President was to be from one group and the vice president
from another .... It is difficult to think of going backward
to regional balance between ethnic groups. I am totally
against the idea of striking a balance between the ethnic
groups. We need to establish equal rights and then a period
of transition to evaluate impact.
4 2
Rwanda must employ language that seeks to balance the call to na-
tional unity with the recognition of different ethnicities.
While much of the above discussion of ethnicity has focused on the
general social status of Rwandans, attaining the proper view of ethnicity
within the political sphere is absolutely crucial. Specifically, Rwanda must
target the practice of marrying power to ethnicity and root it out, as the
myriad of injustices seen in Rwanda often flowed from power imbalances:
ethnic groups were denied access to public employment, education and
basic human rights based on whether the Hutus or Tutsis were in
power.4 13 Thus, as Professor Joy Ezelio of Nigeria stated at the Rwandan
Conference on Constitution Development, one of the major challenges
to most African countries is "dissociating power from ethnicity."454
As Mamdani pointed out, the Second Republic attempted to bring
about some sort of progress by recasting the Tutsi as indigenous rather
than a separate race.4 5 However, the President was ultimately thwarted
450. Part l: The Rwandan Context, supra note 9, at 30.
451. Part I: The New Rwandan Constitution: Its Contents (I), in CONFERENCE ON CONSTI-
TUTION DEVELOPMENT, KJBuYE-RwAN ,A 45, 47 (Aug. 24, 2001) (comments of Otivere
Igbuzor of Nigeria) (unpublished draft of conference proceedings, on file with Professor
Wing).
452. Id. at 39-40 (comments of Gerard Niyungeko of Burundi).
453. See supra Part II.B.1.
454. See Part IL: The New Rwandan Constitution, supra note 451, at 32 (comments of Joy
Ezeilo of Nigeria).
455. MAmDANI, supra note 16, at 99.
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and assassinated by Hutus because of his moves toward power sharing. 45 6
Thus, power sharing and balanced representation must be implemented in
the political process and in all branches of government.
An ethnically sensitive approach should begin in the reform process
of the party system. In particular, the Conference on Constitutional De-
velopment Working Group (Working Group) called for the establishment
of an Election Code that would outline the criteria."7 A significant part
of the regulations must involve a prohibition on the union of power and
control to an ethnic group. Such a rule would then have to be subject to
enforcement through an independent electoral commission. The Working
Group suggested the creation of the Central Election Commission: "a
permanent organ that prepares, supervises, manages, verifies all aspects and
referenda and announces their result."4 Of course, even the Comris-
sion's members must be subject to certain restraints to curb the potential
for a particular ethnicity's corruption of the process.
Within the branches of government, in order to separate power from
any one particular group, ethnicity must also be recognized rather than
ignored. In the executive branch, the Working Group recommended that
the President serve as the head of State and the Prime Minister act as the
head of government. 9 While the intent of this arrangement is to create a
situation of power sharing in the executive branch, the President is the
one that appoints the Prime Minister.' Therefore, Rwanda will have to
decide the proper arrangement: should it go further in requiring that the
President and Prime Minister come from different ethnic groups, as in
Burundi? Will Rwanda return to the historical practice where the Presi-
dent was Hutu or will Rwanda adopt some other such method of checks
and balances?
Concerning the legislative branch, the Working Group recom-
mended a unicameral system where the representatives would be elected
from both a local and national list."1 Three groups would have a certain
number of seats reserved-women, youth and military46 2 Therefore,
Rwanda must recognize the ethnicity problem within Parliament and
consider the use of quotas.
456. Id. at 215.
457. Report of Working Group B, in CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTION DEVELOPMENT 109
(Aug. 24, 2001) (unpublished draft of conference proceedings, on file with Professor
Wing).
458. Id. at 109.
459. Recommendations of the Working Groups, Group A, in CONFERENCE ON CONSTITU-
TIONAL DEVELOPMENT, KIBLrYE-RWANDA 105 (Aug. 24, 2001) (unpublished draft of
conference proceedings, on fie with ProfessorWing).
460. Id.
461. Id. at 106.
462. Id. at 107.
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Finally, the Working Group recommended that judicial review be ex-
ercised by the chamber of the Supreme Court that currently constitutes
the constitutional court.' Jose E. Alvarez advocates that the ethnically
sensitive approach should be extended to the bench of the ICTR because
"[s]uch judges would also provide the tribunal with valuable insights as to
Rwandan law." '64 This approach could also be applied to Rwandan na-
tional courts, ensuring that the Tutsi, Hutu and Twa groups receive
adequate representation on the bench.
Also germane to this discussion on the balance of power is the invo-
cation of a state of emergency and its potential for abuse. Currently, the
Rwanda Constitution permits "[t]he President of the Republic ... when
the situation requires it and after consultation with the Government,
[with] the Constitutional Court and [with] the Bureau of the National
Assembly, [to] proclaim a state of siege or a state of emergency.''6t How-
ever, "the discretion for when to call a state of emergency in Rwanda is
determined by the government itself, which obviously has some significant
contradictions. '" 466 Thus, we must "ensure that the authorities who have
the police and the military under its control, respect the Constitution.
4 67
South Africa's Constitution extensively lays out the conditions upon
which a state of emergency is appropriate, who can declare such an emer-
gency, how long it can last, and what rights can never be derogated.468
Specifically, only an Act of Parliament can declare a state of emergency,
and only when "(a) the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion,
general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster or other public emergency;
and (b) the declaration is necessary to restore peace and order." 469 Such a
declaration is generally limited to twenty-one days, and the validity of
such a declaration can be challenged in any court. 7°
Furthermore, South Africa absolutely prohibits certain rights from
being derogated, even in a state of emergency.471' These rights include
equality in § 9, human dignity in § 10, § 10's right to life, the freedom
and security of the person in § 13, children's rights found in § 28, and
463. Id.
464. Alvarez, supra note 31, at 451.
465. RWANDA CONST. of 1991 tit. III, ch. I, art. 48(1).
466. Session II: Imposition of State of Emergency: Constitutional Safeguards and Suspension of
Rights, in CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTION DEVELOPMENT, KIBuYE-RwANDA 70 (Aug. 24,
2001) (comments of Robin Palmer of South Africa) (unpublished draft of conference
proceedings, on file with ProfessorWing).
467. Id. at 71.
468. S.AF. CONST. ch. 2, § 37(1)-(8).
469. Id. at ch. 2, § 37(1)
470. Id. at ch.2, § 37(2)-(3).
471. Id. at ch. 2, § 37(5) and accompanying table.
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§ 35's rights regarding arrested, detained and accused persons. 472 Thus, if
Rwanda is to abolish the possibility of abuses of power perpetrated
through declarations of states of emergency where basic rights are sus-
pended, it must follow South Africa and include within its constitution an
explicit and comprehensive provision.
In summary, the constitution must prohibit all forms of discrimina-
tion based upon ethnicity, while guaranteeing all people equal rights.
Drawing on Sunstein's notion of a transformative constitution, Rwanda
can look to South Africa's example and its post-apartheid Constitution.
In its Bill of Rights, the South African Constitution includes an unprece-
dented equality section. 473 After declaring everyone equal before the law
and granting them a right to equal protection, it specifically defines equal-
ity as including "the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and
freedoms. '1 74 To accomplish this, it further provides that "legislative and
other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of
persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken. 4 75 Thus,
such provisions rely on Sunstein's anticaste principle, in that it seeks to
eradicate any categories of second-class citizens.
Lest there be any doubt, the South African Constitution's equality
clause makes explicit reference to a wide range of groups and statuses:
"race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour,
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, lan-
guage and birth." 476 In a later provision, South Africa's Bill of Rights also
addresses ethnic and cultural groups with the appropriate limitations:
"Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cul-
tural life of their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a
manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 4 7 Thus,
South Africa has ensured that ethnic affiliation does not trump the rule of
law.
As outlined above, Rwanda must follow in the steps of countries like
South Africa if it is to rid itself of racial and ethnic hatred. This means
drafting a transformative constitution founded upon principles of equality
and "anticaste." Furthermore, as in South Africa, Rwanda must aggres-
sively pursue the establishment and enforcement of ethnic equality
through mechanisms of affirmative action in all spheres of society.
472. Id. Note that some of these Non-Derogable Rights are either entirely protected
or receive limited protection. Id.
473. Id. at ch.2,§ 9.
474. Id. at ch.2, 9(1)&(2).
475. Id. at ch.2, 9(2).
476. Id. at ch.2, § 9(3).
477. Id. at ch.2,§ 30.
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2.Women
Though reforms have been slow going within Rwanda, there are
newly implemented laws that show promise for guaranteeing women's
rights. In October of 1999, women were finally permitted to inherit
property from their husbands and fathers, eliminating the customary prac-
tice that prohibited women from owning property. '78 Furthermore,
couples were empowered to choose the type of property rights that
would govern their relationship, such as community property or joint
ownership. '79 New legislation was also passed in 1998 that prohibits sexual
violence and forced marriage and provides penalties for noncompliance."s
Before these reforms, Rwandan women were regarded as incompetent
and granted the legal status of a minor.
4 '
Even though many of these reforms abolished language establishing
the incapacity of women, discrimination still exists in the marital relation-
ship.4 82 First, there remains a legal recognition of the husband as the head
of the household. 483 Furthermore, the punishment imposed on crimes like
adultery remains more severe for female violators.4 ' Additionally, the
process of acquiring nationality for a foreign spouse remains imbalanced: a
Rwandan husband encounters no obstacles in securing Rwandan citizen-
ship for his spouse, while a Rwandan wife will experience various
impediments in obtaining citizenship for her foreign husband.185 Also
relevant to the marital relationship is the issue of polygamy: while the
constitution recognizes only monogamous marriages, '" de facto polyg-
amy exists in Rwanda. '87 In addition, crimes of a far more grim nature
continue within households, with violence against women a common
element of family life. 88 Unfortunately, justice is rare: "Cases normally are
handled within the context of the extended family and rarely come be-
fore the courts."4 9 Thus, despite micro-reforms, it is clear women need
far more guarantees and protections than those currently provided.
478. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 449, at 12.
479. Id.
480. Rights of Minorities, Disadvantaged, Women and Children, in CONFERENcE ON CONsTI-
TUTION DEvELOPMENT, KIBuYE-Rw DDA 80, 83 (Aug. 24, 2001) (comments of Claudine
Gasarabwe of Rwanda) (unpublished draft of conference proceedings, on file with Prof.
Wing).
481. Id.
482. Id. at 83.
483. Id.
484. Id.
485. Id. at 84.
486. RWANDA CONST. of 1991 tit. II, art. 25, § 1.
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Representation of women in politics and government also remains
inadequate despite the fact that there is no law barring participation of
women. In a 1999 report, there were fifteen women who were members
of the National Assembly and two women on the Cabinet.4 9 To bring
about equality in this area and in others, affirmative action and quotas will
have to be utilized. For example, in South Africa, the African National
Congress reserves one in four seats in parliament for women.491
In concluding this section, it is again imperative to draw from the
South African model concerning the rights of women. The equality
clause includes a number of statuses bearing upon the rights of women,
including prohibiting discrimination based on gender, pregnancy, and
marital status.492 Of course, the other categories delineated may apply to
women as well, which would further highlight the multiplicative nature of
identity. Of course, the affirmative action provision included in the equal-
ity clause would also apply to women.4 93 Additional rights guaranteeing
the freedom of movement, 494 property rights,49 1 freedom from private vio-
lence,496 and a right to reproductive health care497 all directly impact
women.
In adopting a transformative model encompassing an anticaste prin-
ciple, Rwanda must prohibit all direct discrimination against women and
also root out its more indirect effects as South Africa has done.4 9 Thus,
the constitution must prohibit discrimination based on sex, gender, birth,
pregnancy, and marital status in the equality clause. To ensure the attain-
ability of equality, the means must utilize affirmative action and quotas.
Therefore, affirmative action clauses must be inserted in all areas, includ-
ing education, politics, the workplace and the economy.49
Within the right to health, the rights of pregnant women should be
explicitly recognized. Women must also be guaranteed the right to own
property and the right to confer citizenship to a foreign spouse and chil-
dren. Additionally, Rwanda should follow the example of the Ugandan
constitution in its recognition of the constitution's supremacy: "If any
other law or any custom is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the
Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail, and that other law or custom
490. Id. at 11.
491. Rights of Minorities, Disadvantaged, Women and Children, supra note 480, at 82 (com-
ments ofAdrien K.Wing of the United States ofAmerica).
492. S.Ani. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(3).
493. Id. at ch. 2, 5 9(2).
494. Id. at ch. 2, § 21(1).
495. Id. at ch. 2,§ 25.
496. Id. at ch. 2, § 12(1)(c).
497. Id. at ch. 2,§ 26(1).
498. In the equality clause. Id. at ch. 2, § 9(3).
499. Id. at § 115.
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shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void."I' Finally, it is imperative
that Rwanda forbid all forms of public and private violence as South Af-
rica has done: "Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the
person, which includes the right ... to be free from all forms of violence
from either public or private sources.""5 ° Such provisions must be accom-
panied with criminal penalties that are actively enforced.
There exist several other considerations that Rwanda should not ne-
glect as it develops its constitution. They include establishing a gender
commission (in addition to the Ministry of Gender and Women in De-
velopment), creating rights to procreate and protect the family, and
specifically mentioning women in the preamble of the constitution.
On a final note, perhaps one of the instances of good coming from
evil is the rise of women's groups in Rwanda during the post-genocidal
period.0 2 Among the issues being addressed, the difficulties of widows,
orphaned girls, and households headed by children receive primary atten-
tion.53 Also of importance are the "social and cultural barriers to the
equality of women. "504
3. Children
Recognition of children and children's rights occurred in the 1998
legislation referred to previously 05 However, we must ensure that the
constitution is adequate to protect children from the many harms being
inflicted upon children internationally, including increased child labor,
using children as soldiers, the neglect of orphans, children as head of
household, the use of children as sex slaves, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
There presently exists a variety of circumstances affecting Rwandan
children since the genocide. In a 1999 study, eighty-five percent of chil-
dren who were separated from their parents during the genocide had
either been reunited with their family or placed in a foster home.
0 6
Nonetheless, according to UNICEF, some 60,000 children below the age
of eighteen are the head of households.0 7 To the government's credit, it
has been active in assisting and seeking outside aid for these children.
In the area of education, families must pay to enroll children in
school and Rwanda's public schools are unable to house all the children
500. UGANDA CONST. ch. 1, art. 2(2).
501. S.AFR. CONST. ch. 2,§ 12(1)(c).
502. U.S. DEPARTMENT Or STATE, supra note 449, at 12.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Rights of Minorities, Disadvantaged, Women and Children, supra note 480, at 80, 83
(comments of Claudine Gasarabwe of Rwanda).
506. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 449, at 12.
507. Id.
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of school age."' Despite the existence of private schools, they are out of
reach both financially and geographically for most Rwandans."°
The penal system is guilty of mistreatment of children even though
laws prohibit some of the conduct. While the Penal Code forbids impris-
oning a child with an adult, there are reports that approximately 300
children under the age of two have been imprisoned with their moth-
ers."'0 Children are also being imprisoned for crimes related to the
genocide, and few of those incarcerated have been brought to trial. Many
were imprisoned while under the age of fourteen, and some incarcerated
children are still below that age. "
The use of children as soldiers and combatants remains a problem
plaguing many African countries, and Rwanda is no exception to engag-
ing in this abuse. 112 Perhaps one of the most shocking violations during
the genocide involved not only the murder of innocent children, but also
the use of children to carry out the genocide.1 3 Stories abound of chil-
dren being forced to kill or assist their mothers in looting valuables from
the dead bodies.1 4 Possibly one of the most chilling accounts of this took
place in the classroom:
[A]ll the Tutsi students were asked to leave the school and
were segregated.... [E]ighty-two of them, boys and girls
aged between twelve and twenty, were shot and hacked to
death by fellow pupils, villagers, and the gendarmes who had
been sent to protect the youngsters.... Some girls were ab-
ducted by their teachers and repeatedly raped. 15
Additionally, the sons of female killers were used as drivers and es-
corts, and also given opportunities to murder.1 6
Aside from the use of children to carry out acts of genocide, there
are specific instances of children being recruited to act as soldiers and
combatants, which is in direct violation of the Convention on the Rights
of the Child. 17 According to a report from Human Rights Watch, the lack
of adult males in the post-genocide era has created a situation in which
"children as young as fourteen have been pressed into service. They are
often called 'the young ones' or even Kadogo, the local term for child sol-




512. See AFcAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 67-68.
513. Id.
514. Id. at 1-2.
515. Id. at 67-68.
516. Id. at 3-4.
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diers."1 8 In Uganda, the Lord's Resistance Army camp provides an exam-
ple of the tortuous and inhumane conditions to which these children
have been subjected:
Children who do not perform their assigned tasks to the re-
bels' satisfaction are beaten. Children who flout rebel orders
are beaten or killed, often by other abducted children. Failed
escape attempts continue to be punished by death, and suc-
cessful escape attempts lead to retaliation: if one sibling
escapes, the rebels often kill the other sibling19
As a first step, Rwanda has ratified the Convention on the Rights of
the Child,120 a comprehensive treaty that can serve as a resource and
model for drafting those provisions relating to children. In its forty-one
substantive provisions, it grants political, economic, social, cultural, and
humanitarian rights."2 ' As its overarching concern, it establishes rights and
provides protection for those children below age eighteen.52 Among
other things, it invokes the "best interests of the child" standard, estab-
lishes safeguards for adoption, provides guidelines with regard to
punishment for criminal acts, prohibits the use of children as sex slaves,
proscribes the trafficking of children in employment and sex, and limits
the use of children as soldiers.
52 3
In addition, in March of 2001, Rwanda adopted a law to address the
problem of orphans.52 ' Not only are there many orphans who are still
searching for their parents, but as mentioned above they also fulfill the
role of head of household in the meantime. s The law also addresses the
practice of forcing young girls to marry.126 Thus, Rwanda should be
praised for these initial steps taken to conform to the Children's Conven-
tion.
South Africa's transformative constitution explicitly recognizes the
rights of children and provides for their protection. 27 Among its provi-
sions, children are granted the right to (a) to a name and nationality, (b) to
family, parental or alternative care, (c) to basic nutrition, shelter, health and
518. HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE LOCAL DEFENSE FORCE, RWANDA: T"IE SEARCH FOR
SECURITY AND HuMAN RIGHTS ABUSES (April 2000), at http://www.hrw.org/reports/
2000/Rwanda/Rwan004.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2001).
519. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CHILDREN'S RIGHT PROJECT, THE SCARS OF DEATH: CHIL-
DREN ABDUCTED BY THE LORD'S RESISTANCE ARMY IN UGANDA 1 (1997).
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social services, (d) protection from abuse, (e) protection from exploitative
labour, (f) to work regulation, (g) to criminal procedure rights, (h) to legal
representation, and (i) to not have to participate in armed conflict and be
protected.2 Furthermore, the Constitution relies on the "best interests of
the child" standard, and defines children as those less than eighteen years
of age.
5 29
Rwanda's constitution must contain specific provisions on children's
rights, modeled after the Children's Convention and South African
Constitution. It must explicitly recognize children who are orphaned,
homeless, and head of household, and also provide protection and the
greatest degree of care. If Rwandan children are ever going to begin to
heal from the spirit injuries stemming from the genocide-injuries that
include "depression, insomnia, nightmares, mistrust of those around them
and an ever-present fear of being killed, '5 30 the constitution must halt
their neglect and mistreatment. The Children's Convention's provisions
speak directly to the post-genocidal state of Rwandan children: a child has
the right to be protected from all kinds of abuse and neglect, and the
additional right to physical and psychological recovery and social
reintegration. 3
4.A FinalWord on Other Minority Groups:The Disabled and
Elderly, Indigenous, and the Opposition
Disabled persons receive no legal recognition from the law, whether
in the form of restrictions or affirmative action.5 32 The failure to recognize
these persons has made it nearly impossible for those with disabilities to
access employment and education. 33 Furthermore, Rwanda does not re-
quire that public places be adapted to make them accessible to disabled
persons. 34 As in South Africa, 35 the constitution must prohibit
discrimination of disabled persons. As in the U.S., the definition of
disability should include those with HIV/AIDS.136 In Rwanda, the AIDS
rate is eleven percent, whereas in Kigali, it is thirty-three percent among
eighteen to forty-four year olds.137 Furthermore, subject to available
resources, Rwanda should support the provision with accompanying
528. Id. at ch.2, § 28(1)
529. Id. at ch.2, § 28(2)&(3).
530. DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., supra note 71, at 56-57.
531. See CRC, supra note 517, at arts. 19, 39.
532. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 449, at 12.
533. Id.
534. Id.
535. S.ArR. CONST. ch. 2, § 9(3).
536. Rights of Minorities, Disadvantaged, Women and Children, supra note 480, at 80 (corn-
ments ofAdrien K.Wing of the United States of America).
537. Id. at 81.
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Rwanda should support the provision with accompanying legislation that
furthers access of disabled persons to the public sphere.
In addition to disabled persons, the elderly should also be recognized
in the equality clause. Just as the South African Constitution prohibited
such discrimination by including "age" in its equality provision, Rwanda
should also provide for protection of the elderly with such a provision. 3
The genocide brought attention only to the Tutsis and Hutus, there-
fore the Batwa group, descendants of the Twa tribes, has been largely
ignored. The Batwa constitute less than one percent of Rwanda's popula-
tion; thus they are unable to protect themselves against discriminatory
practices.139 With both the Tutsi and Hutu groups regarding the Batwa as
inferior citizens, the Batwa have been thwarted in attempts to acquire
land, housing and education.5 4 ° Such suppression only furthers the inabil-
ity of the Batwa to gain a foothold in government. 41 Thus, a
comprehensive equality clause coupled with affirmative action can assist
in elevating the Batwa to a position where participation in government is
possible.
Finally, during the Conference on Constitutional Development in
Rwanda, a Working Group addressed the need for political minorities to
receive protection. 42 Thus, the constitution must prohibit discrimination
against political opposition and further ensure their rights through the
establishment of a system of checks and balances.
C. Freedom of Speech, Press and Information
The ability of the genocide perpetrators to use extensively the press
and radio to organize, instruct, and incite Hutus to kill exposed the vul-
nerability of the press to manipulation and transformation into a weapon
of genocide. As Ndulo warned, the press in African countries is often
government controlled, ultimately thwarting democratic reform. 43 Most
Rwandans rely on the radio and media for information and there now
exists a profound mistrust of the main source from which they can receive
information. These injustices were especially damaging to the individual
and collective Rwandan spirit. Thus Rwanda must use caution in its
guarantee of the freedom of speech and press: the freedom must be re-
strained in those situations where the speech is likely to cause imminent
violence, and those responsible for restricting such speech must be pro-
hibited from silencing mere dissent or criticism of the government.
538. S.AnR. CONsT. ch. 2, § 9(3).
539. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, supra note 449, at 14.
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Rwanda's track record in guaranteeing such freedoms is certainly
marred despite the fact it has long recognized these freedoms on paper.
4
1
Prior to 1991, only one viewpoint was disseminated in Rwanda-that of
the government.-4 While new information sources opened after 1991
with the creation of the news media, freedom of speech was still greatly
curbed and the government very much dominated the discourse."4 6
Ultimately, this inability to break free of government control resulted in
the use of Radio Rwanda, RTLM, and Kangura to further the
genocide. 47
Even in the post-genocide era, a variety of abuses continue to be re-
ported. Those journalists who refuse to self-censor are routinely
incarcerated by the government, and charges are frequently brought
against those who voice criticism of the government.4 8 For example,
Newsline editor John Mugabi was charged with libel and arrested when
he refused to reveal his source for a story exposing bribery of a govern-
ment official.4 9 It is not surprising that Rwandans are jaded and skeptical
of the prospect of an independent press that presents diverse viewpoints
and cannot be perverted to carry out another genocide:
We are a country that has never experienced freedom of the
press. Just when we were about to experience such a free-
dom of the free public expression, the newspapers and the
media then participated in furthering the violence of geno-
cide. This is why the government and many of the people
mistrust the media and its ability to be independent, impar-
tial, and fair. Some of the media will even say that the
genocide never even took place. Yet in our country where
most of the population is poor, the public depends on the
media for information.
5 5 0
It cannot be denied that Rwanda's context is unique, and conse-
quently, the rights of freedom of speech and press cannot be lifted from
another country and affixed to Rwanda. At the Conference on Constitu-
tional Development, Louis Aucoin acknowledged this complexity:
"[T]oday's problem of incitement and hatred in Rwanda is a special prob-
544. Plenary Session: The Rwandan Constitution: Its Contents (II) Freedom of Speech, Press,
and Information, in CONFERENCE ON CONSTITUTION DEVELOPMENT, KIBUYE-RWANDA 62,63
(Aug. 24, 2001) (comments of Louis Aucoin of the United States of America) (unpub-
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lem and ... the government has both a right and a responsibility to adopt
specific measures to address the situation ... [without] destroying the
freedoms of press and the freedoms of speech." ' Specifically, Aucoin ad-
vised Rwanda to be explicit about how such rights would be applied and
limited.55' However, there are models and experiences to draw upon, in-
cluding the U.S., South Africa and Germany.
As a starting point, a basic U.S. formulation would grant the free-
doms of speech, press and expression so long as they do not incite others
to imminent violence.5 3 While the U.S. has refused to explicitly ban hate
speech for fear of creating a slippery slope that would jeopardize free
speech, it has increased the penalties for crimes motivated by hate.
5 4
However, this does not go far enough in the Rwandan context, and
looking to other countries for guidance may be instructive. In South Af-
rica, a two-stage process was created for the regulation of speech: first, the
complainant must show infringement of a right; and second, the court
conducts a rights-analysis whereby it examines the importance of "the
right being infringed, how effective ... the law [is] in achieving its pur-
pose, and whether the purpose can be achieved through less intrusive
means." '5 Thus, South Africa can "prohibit and limit speech that entails
propaganda for war, incitement for imminent violence, as well as the ad-
vocacy of hatred that is based on ethnicity, gender, or religion and that
may incite others to cause harm.5 51 6 Essentially, South Africa viewed the
American approach to freedom of speech and expression as superseding
all other rights, and South Africa, mindful of the legacy of apartheid, in-
stead chose to adopt a provision that relied on a balancing approach.557
Likewise, Germany faced a similar problem with a free speech provi-
sion in the post-Nazi era.5 Besides prohibiting government from acting
as a censor, government is to take an active role in ensuring freedom of
speech: "The 'guarantee of broadcast freedom' also imposes a 'duty on the
state to see to it that broadcasting facilities' are 'controlled by a broad
spectrum of interest' and also provide 'a forum for a broad spectrum of
opinion.' ,s9 Sunstein rightly points out that this constitutes an "affirma-
tive obligation" on the government to regulate communications, choosing
not to leave it to the private sector." °
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In light of the above models and admonitions, Rwanda will have to
draft its provisions on freedom of speech, press and expression carefully if
it is finally going to achieve penetration (the infiltration of these legal
rules into the general public) in this area and heal the wounds of mistrust.
To do this, Rwanda will have to address the problems of hate, incitement
to commit acts of violence, and the overbearing presence of government
in its efforts to punish those who speak against the State. Consulting both
the post-apartheid South African constitution and the post-Nazi German
constitution and examining subsequent practice and experience can pro-
vide Rwanda with a model for drafting. Indeed, it is imperative that the
freedoms of speech and press be secured: if Rwanda fails to do this, it will
lose one of the greatest elements of a checks and balances system-the
media.
D. Achieving Legitimacy and Penetration: Calling Upon the
Community to Participate in the Drafting of their Constitution
The discourse surrounding the creation of a new constitution must
include the participation of the people who are to be subject to the new
rule of law, a process that Rwanda has already begun.61 This will involve a
three-step process of educating the people, encouraging their participa-
tion so that they have a political voice, and integrating their views into
the constitution.162 Ultimately, the goal of such a process is legitimacy-"a
sense that the constitution belongs to [the people], and that the document
truly reflects the values, history and culture of their country .... [H]istory
reminds us that legitimacy lends considerable force to a government. ' 63
Carrying out the three-step process of achieving legitimacy may in-
volve a variety of tools. The media can be utilized to inform the public of
the issues and of upcoming meetings where they can voice their opinions.
For example, in Benin, they set up a constitutional commission, and teams
were sent out to meet with the people and discuss the draft of the consti-
tution.164 Suggestions of the people were taken seriously, improvements
were made, and then the people voted whether or not to ratify it. 6 Bu-
rundi has also voted on constitutional proposals through referenda.
66
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This process is not without its perils, however, as the inclusion of
"traditional values" may be contrary to the principles of equality as ap-
plied to ethnicity, women, children and other disadvantaged groups.
While this should be a chief concern, such problems can be avoided so
long as participation of all members of society is guaranteed throughout
the process. 67 Thus, the course of creating a constitution must be subject
to the same values sought in the constitution. Otherwise, the people will
view the resulting constitution as illegitimate and ultimately fail to heed
the rule of law.
Finally, the notion of democracy within the Rwandan context must
be carefully scrutinized, as power in numbers works for both good and
evil. For example, women compose a high percentage of the population
in Rwanda due to the many males killed during the genocide. Women,
by their sheer numbers alone, can bring about change and make their
voice known if they unify and vote. On the other hand, power in num-
bers (the Hutu majority) largely led to the genocide. With the Hutus
composing roughly eighty-five percent of the population, they were easily
able to decimate nearly one million Tutsis, which composed fourteen per-
cent of the population.6 In fact, it was the imposition of democracy
under the Belgians in the late 1950's that gave the Hutu's promise of
gaining power and ultimately revenge against their Tutsi masters.5 69 There-
fore, we must learn from history rather than repeat it, and "reflect on the
type of democracy that is needed in Rwanda.
'5 7 0
The above approach is also largely representative of a deliberative
democracy. First, the issues of group polarization and enclaves are highly
relevant: the former "a process by which groups of like-minded people
move one another to increasingly extreme positions, '" 5 7 1 and the latter
describing groups of like-minded people who "will move to positions
that lack merit but are predictable consequences of the particular circum-
stances of enclave deliberation. "
'
72
Insofar as Hutu orTutsi enclaves deliberate exclusively among them-
selves, the Hutu and Tutsi each will have the tendency to shift toward
more extreme positions within their respective groups.573 This can be pre-
vented or at least mitigated if each group is required to listen to the
opinion of the other group-in essence, to hear a voice other than their
own.5 74 Thus, democracy should protect enclaves-as minorities often
567. Id. at 5.
568. BuREAu OF AmFcA AFFAIRS, supra note 24.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. SUNSTEIN, supra note 18, at 8.
572. Id. at 45-46.
573. Id. at 47.
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SPRING 20021
Michigan Journal of Race & Law
find a voice in such forums-but also require that enclaves be exposed to
the views of other such groups.
It is also imperative that Rwanda embrace a second concept of Sun-
stein's-that of incomplete theorization, which encourages agreement on
constitutional practices rather than on the underlying theories. 71 While it
is unlikely that Hutu and Tutsi will agree on the theories underlying vari-
ous proposed provision in the new constitution, it is likely that the two
groups will agree on many of the proposed provisions outlined above. 76
This is a concept that South Africa adopted, as exemplified in the court
case prohibiting the death penalty despite disagreement on the ration-
ale.177 Incomplete theorization can also be used to guarantee something
like the right to housing provided for in South Africa's Constitution-a
provision for which there is no accompanying definition of what this
means. Thus, South Africa has left it open to the courts to interpret the
provision and the obligations placed upon the state, a form of drafting that
allows these notions to take shape over time according to the changing
and evolving nature of a nation. Similarly, Rwandans can come together
through focusing on formulation of broad provisions that will permit fu-
ture decision makers flexibility to meet an uncharted future.
V CONCLUSION
The past decade brought to fruition in a most horrific way the seeds
of hatred and division sown over the past century. Based on the historical
accounts available, it took only 100 years to construct a climate of hatred
that ultimately resulted in the bodily murder of some 800,000 men,
women and children and the spirit murder of those who "survived." '
However, just as the solidification of ethnic cleavages and the ac-
companying hatred was socially constructed and exacerbated to the point
of genocide, so too can healing also begin by deconstructing the web of
lies that now passes for truth within Rwanda. In time, Rwandans, called
by the constitution to remember their shared heritage and reunite as
Rwandans first and foremost, may have the capacity to become a human
rights state where all men, women and children are treated equally on
paper and in practice.
This Article has taken the reader on a journey through the history of
Rwanda's geographical, ethnic, racial and political tapestry, and exposed
both physical and spiritual injuries that have been sustained and currently
575. See id. at 50.
576. Id. at 50.
577. Id. at 53.
578. It is true that a degree of separation did exist prior to the colonial period, but the
last 100 years, half of which were dominated by colonialism, were largely responsible for
the escalating hatred between Hutu and Tutsi.
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continue. With this understanding, it has analyzed the current constitu-
tion, and provided recommendations for a new constitution with
accompanying principles and models.
Part It moved beyond the traditional and often inadequate discourse
of ethnicity alone to witness how European colonialists racialized the
Tutsi initially through the institution of politics and then disseminated
that construction to most public and private institutions. This further ex-
acerbated the line of separation that already existed in the pre-colonial
period, though to a much lesser degree. In essence, the colonialists over-
saw the social construction of race in Rwanda.
When the Hutu subsequently came to power, we saw the marginali-
zation of the Tutsi: the First Republic retained the political framework of
the colonialists that had racialized the Tutsi, but now used it to disadvan-
tage the latter. However, the Second Republic did away with this,
referring to the Tutsi as an ethnicity and branding them as indigenous.
But when the RPF began its invasion into Rwanda, the Hutu were re-
minded that Tutsi power was not yet dead. Consequently, the Hutu
launched an unprecedented defensive action to protect the power and
class attained in the last half of the century, an attack which culminated in
the horrific 100 day genocide during 1994.
In Rwanda's post-genocidal state, the spirit injuries sustained by
both Hutu and Tutsi through racialization are profound and still affect its
victims in all aspects of life. We specifically looked at the impact of the
genocide on women and children, both on victims and on perpetrators.
This Article further examined the current mechanisms of justice at work,
including the ICTR, national Rwandan courts and the newly imple-
mented Gacaca system. Finally, it discussed the current instability of
Rwanda, observing examples of the pressures being exerted on partici-
pants in politics by the military regime, with many being forced to flee
the country.
In Part III, we were exposed to various principles of democracy and
explored their relevance to the Rwandan process. These principles in-
cluded the overarching notion of deliberative democracy coupled with the
following concepts: group polarization, deliberating enclaves, incomplete
theorization, transformative constitutions, anticaste, and socioeconomic
rights. However, the analysis went beyond these abstract principles, and
studied the past experiences of other African countries with the implemen-
tation of democracy. Concerns unique to Africa included ethnicity and
majority rule, curbing military regimes and centralized power, ensuring
freedom of speech and press, fostering participation from the public to gain
legitimacy, and rejecting a "winner-takes-all" system.
The historical and theoretical analysis brought us to Part IV, which
took into consideration the unique context of the region and developed
constitutional recommendations unique to Rwanda. Part IV began with
an analysis of the symptoms of spirit injury currently manifesting
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themselves in Rwanda, and discovered many symptoms revealing lasting
harms from the genocide. Thus, as a component of the healing process-
one of many possible cures-the rule of law must be established in
Rwanda in the form of a new constitution emphasizing human rights.
The analysis first addressed the problems of various minorities and
disadvantaged groups. First, it delved into the possibility of ethnic integra-
tion, recognizing that the racialization and social construction of race
wrought by the colonialists during the early part of the twentieth century
would have to be dismantled. In its place, both Hutu and Tutsi would
have to learn to unite under the banner of Rwandanness-or a sense of
what it is to be a Rwandan. Unfortunately, this concept is currently
empty and without meaning.
The Article then turned its attention to women, children and other
minorities. With regard to women, we uncovered inequality in a number
of areas, and provided constitutional recommendations to remedy these
situations, including the use of quotas and affirmative action. Children
also received special attention, given the many problems confronting these
orphans and heads of households. Additionally, the problem of using chil-
dren in armed combat was examined. Finally, attention was directed at
remaining minority groups-the disabled and elderly, the indigenous and
the opposition. Similar to the other minority groups, recommendations
were intended to give these groups a voice and representation in Rwan-
dan society.
We then explored the area of freedom of speech, press and informa-
tion. Drawing on the experience and models of post-apartheid South
Africa, post-nazi Germany and the United States, we explored various
options and provisions Rwanda could adopt given their unique history of
ethnic hatred. Accounts from Rwanda exposed the mistrust the Rwan-
dans have, especially Tutsis, concerning the media, as it was a tool
manipulated by government and used to facilitate the genocide. Thus, the
media must be severed from government control, and laws must be put
into place limiting the sort of hate speech that fostered the genocide of
1994.
Finally, mindful of the many failures of democracy in Africa, we con-
cluded with a section on how to achieve legitimacy and penetration of
the new rule of law in Rwanda. Specifically, we discussed how the dis-
course could operate, how the public could be assured that their input is
taken into account, and how Rwandans could ultimately voice their ap-
proval or disapproval of the constitution (i.e. through a referendum). Part
IV also looked at many of the principles of democracy discussed in Part
III, considerations highly relevant to the deliberative stage of forming a
democracy that often act as safeguards.
It is hoped that this new constitution, tailored to Rwanda after con-
sidering its unique history and present instability, will constitute just one
of many cures needed so urgently by Rwandans to heal the individual
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and communal spirit injuries that have festered for over 100 years. By
providing them with a constitution centered on human rights, we may
pray for the day when Rwanda is regarded as a model human rights state.
Imagine a day when the apt characterization of Rwanda will not be
Gourevitch's 'We wish to inform you that tomorrow we will be killed
with our families.' Imagine instead a new refrain: 'We wish to inform you
that the killing has stopped and will never start again!'
